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    • 1. 发明申请
    • CLOCK PERIOD RANDOMIZATION FOR DEFENSE AGAINST CRYPTOGRAPHIC ATTACKS
    • 时钟周期随机化防御加密密钥攻击
    • WO2017147116A1
    • 2017-08-31
    • PCT/US2017/018813
    • 2017-02-22
    • GOOGLE INC.
    • STARK, Donald
    • H04L9/00
    • H04L9/002G06F7/582G06F7/588H04L9/003H04L9/004H04L2209/08H04L2209/12
    • Methods, systems, and apparatuses for defending against cryptographic attacks using clock period randomization. The methods, systems, and apparatuses are designed to make side channel attacks and fault injection attacks more difficult by using a clock with a variable period during a cryptographic operation. In an example embodiment, a clock period randomizer includes a fixed delay generator and a variable delay generator, wherein a variable delay generated by the variable delay generator is based on a random or pseudorandom value that is changed occasionally or periodically. The methods, systems, and apparatuses are useful in hardware security applications where fault injection and/or side channel attacks are of concern.
    • 用于防御使用时钟周期随机化的密码攻击的方法,系统和装置。 这些方法,系统和设备被设计成通过在密码操作期间使用具有可变周期的时钟来使侧信道攻击和故障注入攻击更加困难。 在示例实施例中,时钟周期随机数发生器包括固定延迟发生器和可变延迟发生器,其中由可变延迟发生器产生的可变延迟基于随机或周期性改变的随机或伪随机值。 这些方法,系统和设备在涉及故障注入和/或侧信道攻击的硬件安全应用中是有用的。
    • 2. 发明申请
    • FREQUENCY SENSOR FOR SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACK
    • 用于侧向通道攻击的频率传感器
    • WO2017053074A1
    • 2017-03-30
    • PCT/US2016/050662
    • 2016-09-08
    • QUALCOMM INCORPORATED
    • ZHANG, JunmouCHEN, NanZHONG, Guoan
    • H04L9/00
    • G06F1/08G06F21/554G06F2221/034H04L9/004H04L9/005
    • A method, an apparatus, and a computer program product for wireless communication are provided. The apparatus may be used for detecting an incorrect clock frequency. In one example, the apparatus includes a first circuit configured to compare a clock signal period to a delay period. Additionally, in one example, the apparatus includes a second circuit configured to output a first signal. The period of the first signal may be double the clock signal period when the clock signal period is greater than the delay period. The apparatus may, in one example, also include a third circuit configured to output a second signal. The period of the second signal may be greater than double the clock signal period when the clock signal period is greater than the delay period.
    • 提供了一种用于无线通信的方法,装置和计算机程序产品。 该装置可用于检测不正确的时钟频率。 在一个示例中,该装置包括被配置为将时钟信号周期与延迟周期进行比较的第一电路。 另外,在一个示例中,该装置包括被配置为输出第一信号的第二电路。 当时钟信号周期大于延迟周期时,第一信号的周期可以是时钟信号周期的两倍。 在一个示例中,该装置还可以包括被配置为输出第二信号的第三电路。 第二信号的周期可以大于时钟信号周期大于延迟周期的时钟信号周期的两倍。
    • 6. 发明申请
    • CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHOD FOR PROTECTING A KEY HARDWARE REGISTER AGAINST FAULT ATTACKS
    • 用于保护关键硬件寄存器以防止故障攻击的CRYPTOGRAPHIC方法
    • WO2013083485A1
    • 2013-06-13
    • PCT/EP2012/074063
    • 2012-11-30
    • GEMALTO SA
    • SALGADO, StéphaniePERION, Fabrice
    • H04L9/06G06F21/00G06F21/55H04L9/00
    • H04L9/004G06F21/55G06F21/755H04L2209/26
    • The present invention relates to cryptographic method that are resistant to fault injection attacks, to protect the confidentiality and the integrity of secret keys. For that, the invention describes a method to protect a key hardware register against fault attack, this register being inside an hardware block cipher BC embedded inside an electronic component, said component containing stored inside a memory area a cryptographic key K, characterized in that it comprises following steps: A.) loading the key Kram inside said register; B.) computing a value X such as K=BC(K,X); C.) after at least one sensitive operation, computing a value V such as V=BC(K,X); D.) matching the value V with the key Kram value stored in the memory area; E.) if the matching is not ok detecting that a fault occurs.
    • 本发明涉及抵御故障注入攻击的密码方法,以保护秘密密钥的机密性和完整性。 为此,本发明描述了一种保护密钥硬件寄存器免受故障攻击的方法,该寄存器位于嵌入在电子部件内部的硬件块密码BC内,所述组件包含存储在存储器区域内的加密密钥K,其特征在于: 包括以下步骤:A.)将密钥加载到所述寄存器内; 计算诸如K = BC(K,X)的值X; 在至少一个敏感操作之后,计算诸如V = BC(K,X)的值V; D.将值V与存储在存储区域中的密钥克隆值进行匹配; 如果匹配不正确,则检测到故障发生。
    • 7. 发明申请
    • 信号処理装置
    • 信号处理装置
    • WO2013005313A1
    • 2013-01-10
    • PCT/JP2011/065455
    • 2011-07-06
    • 三菱電機株式会社佐藤 恒夫山口 晃由
    • 佐藤 恒夫山口 晃由
    • G06F1/04H04L9/10
    • H03K5/131G06F1/10G09C1/00H04L9/004H04L9/005H04L2209/12
    •  演算回路1からの出力信号Dtを遅延素子3が遅延させて遅延信号Ddを出力し、XOR素子4が出力信号Dtと遅延信号Ddを比較し、両者が一致すれば信号値"0"のXORout信号を出力し、両者が一致しない場合は、信号値"1"のXORout信号を出力する。フリップフロップ61においてクロック信号CKのクロック立ち上がり時のXORout信号の信号値が"0"であれば、フリップフロップ6から出力信号Dtが出力され、クロック立ち上がり時のXORout信号の信号値が一度でも"1"になれば、信号値"0"の固定値が出力され続ける。
    • 延迟元件(3)延迟来自计算电路(1)的输出信号(Dt)并输出延迟信号(Dd)。 如果信号匹配,则XOR元件(4)将输出信号(Dt)与延迟信号(Dd)进行比较,输出信号值0 XORout信号,如果信号不匹配则输出信号值1XORout信号。 在触发器(61)中,如果在时钟信号(CK)上升时XORout信号值为0,则从触发器(6)输出输出信号(Dt),如果XORout信号值 当时钟信号(CK)上升时,其为1偶数,继续输出信号值0的固定值。
    • 9. 发明申请
    • 资讯安全传递系统
    • WO2009033405A1
    • 2009-03-19
    • PCT/CN2008/072255
    • 2008-09-03
    • 诸凤璋
    • 诸凤璋
    • H04L9/32H03M13/35H04M3/42
    • H04L9/004H04L9/3263H04L63/0442H04L63/0823H04L69/40H04L2209/34H04L2209/56H04L2209/60H04L2209/80
    • An information security transmission system is provided, which includes a first information device and a second information device. The first information device obtains at least authentication information and connects with the second information device via a network for information exchange. The system obtains the key pairs for encryption and decryption with or without the help of certification center, builds an information transmission security channel, encrypts and decrypts for the transmitted information and keeps the security of the transmitted information. The first information device has a first dynamic encoder/decoder and the second information device has a second dynamic encoder/decoder respectively. The first dynamic encoder/decoder and the second first dynamic encoder/decoder encode dynamically and ensure a one-time completion of error-free transmission and safety of the transmitted information with mechanism of auto error-detection and mechanism of auto error-correction. And the transmitted information has an access limitation, which makes the receiving party access the transmitted information in the limitation of an accessing condition and delete all the transmitted information when exceeding the accessing limitation so as to prevent the transmitted information from out-flowing.