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    • 7. 发明申请
    • SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR SECURE STORAGE USING OFFLINE PUBLIC KEYS
    • WO2023279171A1
    • 2023-01-12
    • PCT/AU2022/050720
    • 2022-07-08
    • RICHARDSON, Ric B
    • RICHARDSON, Ric B
    • H04L9/40G06F21/62H04L9/14H04L9/30H04L9/32G06Q50/18
    • There is described a method of storing at least one Digital data item of a user; said user characterised by proof of identity data; said method comprising : constructing a data pool; said data pool comprising a digital data record which Includes said at least one digital data item and said proof of identity data; said user associating an ID number selected by the user with the data pool; encrypting the data pool using a symmetric key of a symmetric encryption algorithm so as to form a symmetric encrypted data pool; encrypting the symmetric key using a public key of an asymmetric encryption algorithm so as to form an asymmetric encrypted symmetric key; storing on a server the symmetric encrypted data pool referenced against and together with the ID number and the asymmetric encrypted symmetric key and the public key; said server selectively connectable to the Internet; storing in an off-line storage facility the public key and its associated private key. Also described is a method of recovering said at least one Digital item stored on said server; said method comprising : said user providing an independent nondigital agent with said ID number; said independent nondigital agent accessing said server so as to recover the symmetric encrypted data pool referenced against and together with the ID number and the asymmetric encrypted symmetric key and the public key; said independent nondigital agent accessing the off-line storage facility thereby to recover from said off-line storage facility the public key and its associated private key; said independent nondigital agent utilising the private key to decrypt the asymmetric encrypted symmetric key thereby to recover the symmetric key; said independent nondigital agent utilising the symmetric key and the symmetric encryption algorithm to decrypt the symmetric encrypted data pool so as to recover the data pool; said independent nondigital agent accessing the proof of identity data contained in the data pool; said independent nondigital agent communicating with said user which provided said ID number by entering into a communication interaction so as to verify the identity of said user with reference to said proof of identity data to a predetermined level of certainty; if said independent nondigital agent via said communication interaction verifies the identity of said user to said predetermined level of certainty then said independent nondigital agent communicates said at least one Digital data item to said user.
    • 8. 发明申请
    • METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR DECRYPTION OF END-TO-END ENCRYPTED MESSAGES FOR LAWFUL INTERCEPTION
    • WO2023275775A1
    • 2023-01-05
    • PCT/IB2022/056042
    • 2022-06-29
    • TELECOM ITALIA S.P.A.
    • GOLIC, Jovan
    • H04L9/08H04L9/30H04L9/40H04L63/0442H04L63/164H04L63/306H04L9/0841H04L9/085H04L9/0894H04L9/3073
    • Method for decryption of end-to-end encrypted messages, wherein said messages are encrypted through user plane data encryption, said method comprising: providing at least a first main computer system (LEAI) and one or more first auxiliary computer systems (DEAI.-.DEAI); generating and storing, at the first main computer system (LEA1) and each first auxiliary computer system (DEAI.-.DEAI), a respective random number x0', x1'...xn', wherein each said respective random number is a share in a linear secret sharing scheme, wherein the secret is x', wherein said secret x' can be obtained from xO' and an arbitrary subset of k' out of n of said respective random numbers (xl'...xn'), wherein k' is equal to or larger than 2 and equal to or smaller than n, wherein the secret x' is not calculated; generating and storing, at the first main computer system (LEA1) and each of said first auxiliary computer systems (DEAI.-.DEAI), a respective first escrow encryption public key share, on the basis of the respective random number; sending, from each first auxiliary computer system (DEAI.-.DEAI) to the first main computer system (LEA1) the respective first escrow encryption public key share; calculating, at the first main computer system (LEA1), a first escrow encryption public key by combining the first escrow encryption public key share of the first main computer system (LEA1) with the first escrow encryption public key shares of the first auxiliary computer systems, wherein x' is a first escrow decryption private key for decrypting strings which have been encrypted with said first escrow encryption public key; determining, by a telecommunications network (TLC), that a first user equipment (UEA) is to send user plane data to a second user equipment (UEB); determining, by a cooperation of the first main computer system (LEA1) and said telecommunications network (TLC), if said first user equipment (UEA) and/or said second user equipment (UEB) is a target of lawful interception associated with the first main computer system (LEA1); when user plane data are to be sent from said first user equipment (UEA) to said second user equipment (UEB) and said first user equipment (UEA) and/or said second user equipment (UEB) is a target of lawful interception, configuring said first user equipment (UEA) to generate: an end-to-end encrypted message (CT) obtained by encrypting, with a session key (K), a plain message (PT) formed by said user plane data, wherein said end-to-end encrypted message (CT) is intended for said second user equipment (UEB), to be decrypted by using the session key (K); an attachment (K') to be associated to said end-to-end encrypted message (CT), wherein said attachment (K') includes at least an escrow encrypted key (K), obtained by encrypting said session key (K) using an escrow encryption function and said first escrow encryption public key, wherein an escrow decryption function corresponding to said escrow encryption function is homomorphic with respect to said first escrow decryption private key x'. The method further comprises: receiving from the first user equipment (UEA), at the first main computer system (LEA1) through said communications network (TLC), said end-to-end encrypted message (CT) and said attachment (K'); forwarding via said communications network (TLC) said end-to-end encrypted message (CT) to said second user equipment (UEB), without said attachment (K'); sending from the first main computer system (LEA1) to each first auxiliary computer system (DEAI.-.DEAI) a partial escrow decryption request (Req_Dec); receiving at the first main computer system (LEA1), from each first auxiliary computer system (DEAI.-.DEAI), a partial escrow decryption response (Dec) calculated on the basis of the respective random number xi' and calculating a partial escrow decryption result of said first main computer system (LEA1) on the basis of the random number xO'; decrypting said escrow encrypted key (K) at the first main computer system (LEA1) using the partial escrow decryption responses (Dec) from a subset of k' out of n first auxiliary computer systems (.DEAI.-.DEAI) and the partial escrow decryption result of said first main computer system (LEA1), thereby obtaining the session key (K) in a shared way; decrypting said end-to-end encrypted message (CT) using said session key (K), thereby obtaining said plain message (PT) at the first main computer system (LEA1).