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    • 3. 发明申请
    • CLOCK PERIOD RANDOMIZATION FOR DEFENSE AGAINST CRYPTOGRAPHIC ATTACKS
    • 时钟周期随机化防御加密密钥攻击
    • WO2017147116A1
    • 2017-08-31
    • PCT/US2017/018813
    • 2017-02-22
    • GOOGLE INC.
    • STARK, Donald
    • H04L9/00
    • H04L9/002G06F7/582G06F7/588H04L9/003H04L9/004H04L2209/08H04L2209/12
    • Methods, systems, and apparatuses for defending against cryptographic attacks using clock period randomization. The methods, systems, and apparatuses are designed to make side channel attacks and fault injection attacks more difficult by using a clock with a variable period during a cryptographic operation. In an example embodiment, a clock period randomizer includes a fixed delay generator and a variable delay generator, wherein a variable delay generated by the variable delay generator is based on a random or pseudorandom value that is changed occasionally or periodically. The methods, systems, and apparatuses are useful in hardware security applications where fault injection and/or side channel attacks are of concern.
    • 用于防御使用时钟周期随机化的密码攻击的方法,系统和装置。 这些方法,系统和设备被设计成通过在密码操作期间使用具有可变周期的时钟来使侧信道攻击和故障注入攻击更加困难。 在示例实施例中,时钟周期随机数发生器包括固定延迟发生器和可变延迟发生器,其中由可变延迟发生器产生的可变延迟基于随机或周期性改变的随机或伪随机值。 这些方法,系统和设备在涉及故障注入和/或侧信道攻击的硬件安全应用中是有用的。
    • 6. 发明申请
    • RANDOM CIPHER PAD CRYPTOGRAPHY
    • 随机CIPHER PAD CRYPTOGRAPHY
    • WO2017011046A3
    • 2017-02-16
    • PCT/US2016028504
    • 2016-04-20
    • 7TUNNELS INC
    • HAMMON MICHAEL LMCCARTHY KEVIN R
    • H04L9/06
    • H04L9/065G06F7/588H04L9/0656
    • Methods for a server include defining a starting element and an element step size. A pad mapping is applied to a data Random Cipher Pad (RCP) to obtain a Key RCP using each element of the Data RCP once in a predetermined non-sequential order. The starting element and the element step size are combined with the Data RCP. The Data RCP is encrypted using the Key RCP to produce a subsequent Data RCP. The subsequent Data RCP is transmitted to another computer. Methods for clients include applying a pad mapping to a Data RCP to obtain a Key RCP using each element of the Data RCP once in a predetermined non-sequential order to develop the Key RCP. The Key RCP is encrypted using the Data RCP to produce a subsequent Key RCP. A data structure is encrypted using the Data RCP to produce an encrypted data structure.
    • 服务器的方法包括定义起始元素和元素步长。 将衬垫映射应用于数据随机密码(RCP)以使用数据RCP的每个元素以预定的非顺序顺序获得密钥RCP一次。 起始元素和元素步长与Data RCP组合。 数据RCP使用密钥RCP加密,以产生后续的数据RCP。 随后的数据RCP被传送到另一台计算机。 客户端的方法包括将数据RCP应用焊盘映射以使用数据RCP的每个元素以预定的非连续顺序一次获得密钥RCP以开发密钥RCP。 密钥RCP使用数据RCP加密以产生随后的密钥RCP。 使用Data RCP对数据结构进行加密以产生加密的数据结构。
    • 8. 发明申请
    • RESILIENT DEVICE AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM WITH METADATA BINDING
    • 具有元数据绑定的灵活的设备认证系统
    • WO2016025940A1
    • 2016-02-18
    • PCT/US2015/045467
    • 2015-08-17
    • SYPRIS ELECTRONICS, LLC
    • WALSH, JohnWALLRABENSTEIN, John Ross
    • G06F7/04
    • G06F21/73G06F7/588G06F21/44
    • A resilient device authentication system for use with managed devices each including a physically-unclonable function ("PUF"), comprising verification authorities ("VAs") including a complete verification set ("loaded CVS") that includes hardware part-specific data associated with the PUFs of the managed devices, each VA configured to create a limited verification set ("LVS") that includes representation of CVS data to redundantly verify all hardware parts associated with the LVS and configured to construct a replacement LVS; and provisioning entities ("PEs") connectable to VAs and to the managed devices, each PE including a LVS, and configured to select a subset of the loaded LVS to create an application limited verification set; wherein the loaded CVS includes metadata, and eac of the one or more VAs is configured to perform one-way algorithmic transformation of hardware part-specific data together with metadata from the loaded CVS to create a LVS representing both metadata and hardware part-specific data.
    • 一种与管理设备一起使用的弹性设备认证系统,每个管理设备包括物理上不可克隆的功能(“PUF”),包括验证机构(“VAs”),其包括完整的验证集(“加载的CVS”),其包括相关联的硬件部分特定的数据 与被管理设备的PUF一起,每个VA被配置为创建包括CVS数据表示的有限验证集(“LVS”),以冗余地验证与LVS相关联的所有硬件部件并被配置为构建替换LVS; 以及可连接到VAs和被管理设备的供应实体(“PE”),每个PE包括LVS,并且被配置为选择所加载的LVS的子集以创建应用限制验证集; 其中所述加载的CVS包括元数据,并且所述一个或多个VAs的eac被配置为执行硬件部分特定数据与来自加载的CVS的元数据的单向算法转换,以创建表示元数据和硬件部分特定数据的LVS 。