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    • 1. 发明授权
    • Trusted execution environment virtual machine cloning
    • 可信执行环境虚拟机克隆
    • US08954965B2
    • 2015-02-10
    • US13566250
    • 2012-08-03
    • Mark F. NovakAndrew John LaymanMagnus NyströmStefan Thom
    • Mark F. NovakAndrew John LaymanMagnus NyströmStefan Thom
    • G06F9/455
    • G06F21/53
    • Cloning of a virtual machine having a trusted executed environment such as a software-based trusted platform module. In order to clone the virtual machine, the virtual machine state of the source virtual machine is copied to formulate a target virtual machine state that is to be associated with a target virtual machine. The target virtual machine is a clone of the source virtual machine state, and thus the storage hierarchy of the trusted execution environment may be the same for the trusted execution environment in the source and target virtual machine states. However, because the identity of the target virtual machine is different than that of the source virtual machine, the endorsement hierarchy of the target virtual machine state is altered such that it is based on the identity of the target virtual machine, rather than the source virtual machine.
    • 克隆具有可信执行环境的虚拟机,例如基于软件的可信平台模块。 为了克隆虚拟机,将复制源虚拟机的虚拟机状态以制定与目标虚拟机相关联的目标虚拟机状态。 目标虚拟机是源虚拟机状态的克隆,因此受信任执行环境的存储层次结构对于源虚拟机状态和目标虚拟机状态中的受信任执行环境可能相同。 然而,由于目标虚拟机的身份与源虚拟机的身份不同,所以目标虚拟机状态的认可层级被改变,使得其基于目标虚拟机的身份而不是源虚拟机 机。
    • 2. 发明申请
    • TRUSTED EXECUTION ENVIRONMENT VIRTUAL MACHINE CLONING
    • 实施执行环境虚拟机克隆
    • US20140040890A1
    • 2014-02-06
    • US13566250
    • 2012-08-03
    • Mark F. NovakAndrew John LaymanMagnus NyströmStefan Thom
    • Mark F. NovakAndrew John LaymanMagnus NyströmStefan Thom
    • G06F9/455
    • G06F21/53
    • Cloning of a virtual machine having a trusted executed environment such as a software-based trusted platform module. In order to clone the virtual machine, the virtual machine state of the source virtual machine is copied to formulate a target virtual machine state that is to be associated with a target virtual machine. The target virtual machine is a clone of the source virtual machine state, and thus the storage hierarchy of the trusted execution environment may be the same for the trusted execution environment in the source and target virtual machine states. However, because the identity of the target virtual machine is different than that of the source virtual machine, the endorsement hierarchy of the target virtual machine state is altered such that it is based on the identity of the target virtual machine, rather than the source virtual machine.
    • 克隆具有可信执行环境的虚拟机,例如基于软件的可信平台模块。 为了克隆虚拟机,将复制源虚拟机的虚拟机状态以制定与目标虚拟机相关联的目标虚拟机状态。 目标虚拟机是源虚拟机状态的克隆,因此受信任执行环境的存储层次结构对于源虚拟机状态和目标虚拟机状态中的受信任执行环境可能相同。 然而,由于目标虚拟机的身份与源虚拟机的身份不同,所以目标虚拟机状态的认可层级被改变,使得其基于目标虚拟机的身份而不是源虚拟机 机。
    • 10. 发明申请
    • PROTECTING USER CREDENTIALS FROM A COMPUTING DEVICE
    • 从计算机设备保护用户凭证
    • US20130205360A1
    • 2013-08-08
    • US13368731
    • 2012-02-08
    • Mark F. NovakAndrew J. Layman
    • Mark F. NovakAndrew J. Layman
    • G06F21/00
    • H04L63/102H04L63/0815H04L63/083H04L63/0853H04L63/0884H04L2463/102
    • Protecting user credentials from a computing device includes establishing a secure session between a computing device and an identity provider (e.g., a Web service). Parameters of the secure session are communicated to a credential service, which renegotiates or resumes the secure session to establish a new secure session between the credential service and the identity provider. User credentials are passed from the credential service to the identity provider via the new secure session, but the computing device does not have the parameters of the new secure session and thus does not have access to the passed user credentials. The credential service then renegotiates or resumes the secure session again to establish an additional secure session between the credential service and the identity provider. Parameters of the additional secure session are communicated to the computing device to allow the computing device to continue communicating securely with the identity provider.
    • 保护来自计算设备的用户凭证包括在计算设备和身份提供商(例如,Web服务)之间建立安全会话。 安全会话的参数被传送到凭证服务,该凭证服务重新协商或恢复安全会话以在证书服务和身份提供者之间建立新的安全会话。 用户凭证通过新的安全会话从凭证服务传递给身份提供者,但计算设备不具有新安全会话的参数,因此无法访问所传递的用户凭据。 然后,凭证服务再次重新协商或恢复安全会话,以在凭证服务和身份提供商之间建立额外的安全会话。 附加安全会话的参数被传送到计算设备以允许计算设备继续与身份提供商通信。