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    • 22. 发明公开
    • 스마트카드의 보안장치
    • 智能卡安全设备
    • KR1020040071509A
    • 2004-08-12
    • KR1020030007517
    • 2003-02-06
    • 삼성전자주식회사
    • 김서규
    • G06K19/07
    • G06K19/073G06K19/07363
    • PURPOSE: A security device for a smart card is provided to protect a password more safely from the external hacking by the power analysis and a decapsulation state of the smart card. CONSTITUTION: The external voltage applied to a smart card chip(6) is supplied to an internal voltage node(11) through a switch. The internal voltage node is connected to the ground voltage through a diode and a resistor. A variable capacitor is connected between the internal voltage node and the ground voltage. A variable control unit(10) comprises a comparator connecting a non-inverted input terminal with the internal voltage node and the reference voltage, an up/down counter generating the digital counting output by responding to a comparison signal output from the comparator, a DAC(Digital Analog Converter) converting the counting output into a variable control signal of an analog value.
    • 目的:提供智能卡的安全设备,通过功率分析和智能卡的解封装状态,更安全地保护密码免受外部黑客攻击。 构成:施加到智能卡芯片(6)的外部电压通过开关提供给内部电压节点(11)。 内部电压节点通过二极管和电阻连接到地电压。 内部电压节点与接地电压之间连接有可变电容。 可变控制单元(10)包括连接非反相输入端子与内部电压节点和参考电压的比较器,响应于从比较器输出的比较信号产生数字计数输出的上/下计数器,DAC (数字模拟转换器)将计数输出转换为模拟值的可变控制信号。
    • 24. 发明授权
    • 전자기분석 공격을 방지하기 위한 스마트 카드 시스템
    • 用于在智能卡系统中保护电磁分析攻击的智能卡系统
    • KR101025421B1
    • 2011-03-30
    • KR1020090115984
    • 2009-11-27
    • 한국조폐공사
    • 양희선
    • G06K17/00G06K19/07
    • G06K19/07363G06K19/07767
    • PURPOSE: A smart card system for defending an electromagnetic analysis attack is provided to improve the security by using a circuit which generates dummy current. CONSTITUTION: A smart card(100) has an electromagnetic wave analysis attack preventing apparatus including an IC chip occurring the heap electromagnetic wave. A terminal(200) reads the information of the smart card. A first IC chip(110) performs an origin function of the smart card. A second IC chip(130) performs a dummy work including a random number generation process. The first antenna(120) communicates with the terminal.
    • 目的:提供一种用于捍卫电磁分析攻击的智能卡系统,通过使用产生虚拟电流的电路来提高安全性。 构成:智能卡(100)具有包括发生堆电磁波的IC芯片的电磁波分析防止装置。 终端(200)读取智能卡的信息。 第一IC芯片(110)执行智能卡的起始功能。 第二IC芯片(130)执行包括随机数生成处理的虚拟工作。 第一天线(120)与终端通信。
    • 25. 发明公开
    • 전력 분석 공격 차단을 위한 IC카드
    • 用于保护电力监控攻击的IC卡
    • KR1020100046417A
    • 2010-05-07
    • KR1020080105247
    • 2008-10-27
    • 고려대학교 산학협력단
    • 정성우장형범이종성
    • G06K19/073G06K19/07G06F21/00
    • G06K19/07363G06K19/0715
    • PURPOSE: An IC card for protecting a power monitoring attack is provided to protect an internal secret key or important information from physical attack by regularly maintaining the power consumption for the all operations of a CPU. CONSTITUTION: A CPU(Central Processing Unit)(120) performs the data operation and generation data operation for a secret key or important information. An interface module(110) performs security recognition and data I/O of a contact or non-contact method. A crypto coprocessor(170) manages the secret key or a password. A DVFS(Dynamic Voltage Frequency Scaling) controller(130) controls the power consumption regularly for the all operations of the CPU.
    • 目的:提供一种用于保护电源监控攻击的IC卡,以便通过定期维护CPU所有操作的功耗来保护内部秘密密钥或重要信息免受物理攻击。 构成:CPU(中央处理单元)(120)对秘密密钥或重要信息执行数据操作和生成数据操作。 接口模块(110)执行接触或非接触方法的安全识别和数据I / O。 密码协处理器(170)管理秘密密钥或密码。 DVFS(动态电压频率缩放)控制器(130)针对CPU的所有操作定期控制功耗。
    • 30. 发明公开
    • 정보 처리 장치
    • 信息处理设备
    • KR1020000052458A
    • 2000-08-25
    • KR1019990057028
    • 1999-12-13
    • 가부시키가이샤 히타치세이사쿠쇼
    • 오오끼마사루후꾸자와야스꼬오꾸하라스스무가미나가마사히로
    • G06K13/00
    • G07F7/1008G06F21/75G06F21/755G06K19/07363G06Q20/341G07F7/082
    • PURPOSE: An information processing equipment is provided to reduce the relation between the data process in an IC card chip and its consumption current by processing the data in the IC card chip after it is transformed so it is difficult to presume the data process and the cipher key from the consumption current wave shape. CONSTITUTION: A cipher text is subjected first to initial permutation IP(902). This permutation is performed by using an initial permutation table to exchange 64-bit data of the cipher text on the one-bit unit basis. A series of such operations is repeated sixteen stages to inverse permutation (IP ) 915 of the initial permutation. At each stage, a process called an f function 903 is calculated by inputting data of 32 bits of either the first or second half at the preceding stage and the cipher key, and then an exclusive logical OR operation 909 is performed by using the output of the f function and 32 bits of the remaining half at the preceding stage. Data of the cipher key is also exchanged. Data of the cipher key is first subjected to selectable permutation PC-1(905) by using a table PC-1. Thereafter, data of the cipher key is subjected to selectable permutation PC-2 (908) by using a table PC-2. At the next stage, each set of 28 bits of the cipher key rounded in accordance with an RS table is used. In this embodiment, before the IP process, the transforming process a(901) for transforming a plain text, transforming process b(904) for untransforming a cipher key, and lastly untransforming process(916) are additionally executed. The transforming process a(901) transforms a plain text so as to later process the transformed plain text and so as not to process the plain text itself by the IP process(902) and f function process(903). Data of the plain text therefore becomes hard to be presumed from the current wave shape during the data process. The transforming process b(904) transforms a cipher key so as to later process the transformed cipher key and so as not to process the cipher key itself by the PC-1 process(905), LS process(907), PC-2 process(908) and f function(903). Data of the cipher key therefore becomes hard to be presumed from the current wave shape during the data process.
    • 目的:提供一种信息处理设备,用于通过处理IC卡芯片中的数据进行变换,以减少IC卡芯片中的数据处理与其消耗电流之间的关系,因此难以推定数据处理和密码 关键是消耗电流波形。 规定:密文首先进行初始置换IP(902)。 通过使用初始置换表来以一比特单位交换密文的64位数据来执行该置换。 一系列这样的操作重复十六个阶段以逆序排列(IP <-1>)915的初始置换。 在每个阶段,通过输入前一级的第一或第二半的32位的数据和密码密钥来计算称为f函数903的处理,然后通过使用输出 f功能和前一级剩余半部的32位。 密码密钥的数据也被交换。 首先通过使用表PC-1对密码密钥的数据进行可选择置换PC-1(905)。 此后,使用表PC-2对密码密钥的数据进行可选择置换PC-2(908)。 在下一阶段,使用根据RS表格舍入的每组28位的密码密钥。 在本实施例中,在IP处理之前,还附加地执行用于变换明文的变换处理a(901),用于解密密码密钥的变换的变换处理b(904)和最后的不变形处理(916)。 转换过程a(901)转换明文,以便稍后处理变换的纯文本,并且不通过IP处理(902)和f函数处理(903)处理纯文本本身。 因此,在数据处理期间,明文的数据变得难以从当前的波形推定出来。 转换处理b(904)转换密码密钥以便稍后处理转换后的加密密钥,以便不通过PC-1处理(905),LS处理(907),PC-2进程处理加密密钥本身 (908)和f函数(903)。 因此,在数据处理期间,密码密钥的数据难以从当前的波形推定出来。