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    • 1. 发明申请
    • TECHNOLOGIES FOR DYNAMIC LOADING OF INTEGRITY PROTECTED MODULES INTO SECURE ENCLAVES
    • 将完整保护模块动态加载到安全壳中的技术
    • WO2017172157A1
    • 2017-10-05
    • PCT/US2017/019642
    • 2017-02-27
    • INTEL CORPORATION
    • SHANAHAN, Mark W.XING, Bin
    • G06F21/53H04L9/06
    • Technologies for dynamic loading of integrity protected modules into a secure enclave include a computing device having a processor with secure enclave support. The computing device divides an executable image into multiple chunks, hashes each of the chunks with corresponding attributes that affect security to generate a corresponding hash value, and generates a hash tree as a function of the hash values. The computing device generates an initial secure enclave memory image that includes the root value of the hash tree. At runtime, the computing device accesses a chunk of the executable image from within the secure enclave, which generates a page fault. In response to the page fault, the secure enclave verifies the associated chunk based on the hash tree and accepts the chunk into the secure enclave in response to successful verification. The root value of the hash tree is integrity-protected. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
    • 用于将完整性保护模块动态加载到安全区域中的技术包括具有带安全区域支持的处理器的计算设备。 计算设备将可执行映像划分成多个块,用影响安全性的对应属性对每个块进行散列以生成对应的散列值,并根据散列值生成散列树。 计算设备生成包括散列树的根值的初始安全区域存储器映像。 在运行时,计算设备从安全区域内访问可执行映像的块,这产生页面错误。 响应页面错误,安全区域基于哈希树来验证相关联的块,并且响应于成功验证将块接受到安全区域中。 哈希树的根值受到完整性保护。 描述并要求保护其他实施例。
    • 2. 发明申请
    • INCREMENTAL PROVISIONING OF SOFTWARE
    • 软件增量提供
    • WO2006045217A1
    • 2006-05-04
    • PCT/CN2004/001221
    • 2004-10-28
    • INTEL CORPORATIONXING, BinCHEN, LechongYU, KeMEI, JianfengCHEN, Yi
    • XING, BinCHEN, LechongYU, KeMEI, JianfengCHEN, Yi
    • G06F9/445
    • G06F11/1435G06F11/1471
    • Methods and apparatuses provide for incremental provisioning of software for a processing system. For instance, a processing system may include a machine accessible medium and a processor in communication with the machine accessible medium. In addition, instructions encoded in the machine accessible medium may cause the processing system to automatically determine whether a storage device in the processing system includes modified blocks, based at least in part on a write log file that identifies blocks that were modified during a user session on the processing system. In response to identifying at least one modified block in the storage device, the processing system may automatically replace data in the modified block with backup data from a different storage device. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
    • 方法和装置提供用于处理系统的软件的增量配置。 例如,处理系统可以包括机器可访问介质和与机器可访问介质通信的处理器。 另外,在机器可访问介质中编码的指令可以使得处理系统至少部分地基于写入日志文件来自动确定处理系统中的存储设备是否包括修改的块,该写入日志文件标识在用户会话期间被修改的块 在处理系统上。 响应于识别存储设备中的至少一个修改的块,处理系统可以自动地用修改的块中的数据替换来自不同存储设备的备份数据。 描述和要求保护其他实施例。
    • 6. 发明申请
    • NESTED EXCEPTION HANDLING
    • 嵌套异常处理
    • WO2018080684A1
    • 2018-05-03
    • PCT/US2017/053088
    • 2017-09-22
    • INTEL CORPORATION
    • XING, Bin
    • G06F21/53G06F21/54G06F21/56
    • G06F12/1009G06F9/30054G06F9/30076G06F9/3802G06F9/3861G06F12/08G06F12/109G06F12/12G06F12/128G06F12/145G06F21/79G06F2212/1052G06F2212/657G06F2212/684G06F2212/70
    • An example system that includes a processor and a memory device. The processor may include multiple execution units to execute instructions and a memory device coupled to the processor. The memory device stores the instructions in an unprotected region and a protected region. The processor may determine that a first exception occurred while executing a first set of instructions for an application stored in a secured page of the protected region. The processor may invoke a first subroutine to forward exception context for the first exception to a second subroutine, where the first subroutine is stored in the protected region and the second subroutine is stored in the unprotected region. The processor may invoke, by the second subroutine, a third subroutine to execute a second set of instructions associated with the exception context for the first exception.
    • 包含处理器和存储器设备的示例系统。 处理器可以包括执行指令的多个执行单元和耦合到处理器的存储器设备。 存储设备将指令存储在未受保护的区域和受保护的区域中。 处理器可以确定在执行存储在受保护区域的受保护页面中的应用的第一组指令时发生第一异常。 处理器可以调用第一子例程来将用于第一例外的异常上下文转发到第二子例程,其中第一子例程存储在受保护区域中并且第二子例程存储在未受保护区域中。 处理器可以通过第二子例程调用第三子例程来执行与第一例外的异常上下文相关联的第二组指令。

    • 7. 发明申请
    • TECHNOLOGIES FOR SECURE PROGRAMMING OF A CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINE FOR SECURE I/O
    • 用于安全I / O的CRYPTOGRAPHIC发动机的安全技术
    • WO2017014889A1
    • 2017-01-26
    • PCT/US2016/038396
    • 2016-06-20
    • INTEL CORPORATION
    • CHHABRA, SiddharthaGERZON, GideonLAL, ReshmaXING, BinPAPPACHAN, Pradeep M.MCGOWAN, Steven B.
    • G06F21/60
    • G06F21/72G06F21/57H04L9/0822H04L9/0861H04L9/3242
    • Technologies for secure programming of a cryptographic engine include a computing device with a cryptographic engine and one or more I/O controllers. The computing device establishes, an invoking secure enclave using secure enclave support of a processor. The invoking enclave configures channel programming information, including a channel key, and invokes a processor instruction with the channel programming information as a parameter. The processor generates wrapped programming information including an encrypted channel key and a message authentication code. The encrypted channel key is protected with a key known only to the processor. The invoking enclave provides the wrapped programming information to untrusted software, which invokes a processor instruction with the wrapped programming information as a parameter. The processor unwraps and verifies the wrapped programming information and then programs the cryptographic engine. The processor generates an authenticated response that may be verified by the invoking enclave. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
    • 用于加密引擎的安全编程的技术包括具有密码引擎和一个或多个I / O控制器的计算设备。 计算设备使用处理器的安全飞地支持来建立调用安全飞地。 调用飞地配置信道编程信息,包括信道密钥,并且以通道编程信息为参数来调用处理器指令。 处理器产生包括加密的信道密钥和消息认证码的包装节目信息。 加密的通道密钥由仅对处理器已知的密钥进行保护。 调用的包层将包装的编程信息提供给不受信任的软件,该软件以包装的编程信息作为参数调用处理器指令。 处理器解封装并验证封装的编程信息,然后对加密引擎进行编程。 处理器生成可以通过调用飞地验证的认证响应。 描述和要求保护其他实施例。
    • 8. 发明申请
    • CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION OF I/O DATA FOR DMA CAPABLE I/O CONTROLLERS
    • 用于DMA能力I / O控制器的I / O数据的保护
    • WO2017014885A1
    • 2017-01-26
    • PCT/US2016/038389
    • 2016-06-20
    • INTEL CORPORATION
    • LAL, ReshmaMCGOWAN, Steven B.CHHABRA, SiddharthaGERZON, GideonXING, BinPAPPACHAN, Pradeep M.ELBAZ, Reouven
    • G06F21/60G06F13/28
    • H04L9/0631G06F13/28H04L9/0618H04L9/0822H04L9/3242
    • Technologies for cryptographic protection of I/O data include a computing device with one or more I/O controllers. Each I/O controller may be coupled to one or more I/O devices. Each I/O controller may generate a direct memory access (DMA) transaction that includes a channel identifier that is indicative of the I/O controller and that is indicative of an I/O device coupled to the I/O controller. The computing device intercepts the DMA transaction and determines whether to protect the DMA transaction as a function of the channel identifier. If so, the computing device performs a cryptographic operation using an encryption key associated with the channel identifier. The computing device may include a cryptographic engine that intercepts the DMA transaction and determines whether to protect the DMA transaction by determining whether the channel identifier matches an entry in a channel identifier table of the cryptographic engine. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
    • 用于I / O数据加密保护的技术包括具有一个或多个I / O控制器的计算设备。 每个I / O控制器可以耦合到一个或多个I / O设备。 每个I / O控制器可以生成包括指示I / O控制器并且指示耦合到I / O控制器的I / O设备的信道标识符的直接存储器访问(DMA)事务。 计算设备拦截DMA事务,并根据信道标识确定是否保护DMA事务。 如果是这样,则计算设备使用与该信道标识符相关联的加密密钥来执行密码操作。 计算设备可以包括密码引擎,其拦截DMA事务并且通过确定信道标识符是否匹配密码引擎的信道标识符表中的条目来确定是否保护DMA事务。 描述和要求保护其他实施例。
    • 10. 发明申请
    • TECHNOLOGIES FOR SOFTWARE ATTACK DETECTION USING ENCODED ACCESS INTENT
    • 使用编码访问功能的软件攻击检测技术
    • WO2017053003A1
    • 2017-03-30
    • PCT/US2016/048959
    • 2016-08-26
    • INTEL CORPORATION
    • XING, BinZMUDZINSKI, KrystofWU, Wei A.LU, Shih-Lien L.ROZAS, Carlos V.MCKEEN, Francis X.CHHABRA, SiddharthaSHANAHAN, Mark W.
    • G06F21/12G06F11/10
    • G06F21/53G06F21/79G06F2221/033
    • Technologies for software attack detection include a computing device with a processor and a memory external to the processor. The processor originates a memory transaction with an associated secure enclave status bit that indicates whether the memory transaction originated in a secure execution mode, such as from a secure enclave. The processor computes an error-correcting code (ECC) based as a function of memory transaction data and the secure enclave status bit, and performs the memory transaction based on the ECC and the memory transaction data using the memory of the computing device. The processor may store the ECC and the memory transaction data to memory. The processor may load a stored ECC and data from the memory and compare the computed ECC to the stored ECC to detect memory transactions with an invalid secure enclave status bit. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
    • 用于软件攻击检测的技术包括具有处理器的计算设备和处理器外部的存储器。 处理器产生具有相关联的安全空间状态位的存储器事务,其指示存储器事务是否起始于安全执行模式,例如来自安全飞地。 处理器根据存储器事务数据和安全区域状态位来计算纠错码(ECC),并且使用计算设备的存储器基于ECC和存储器事务数据执行存储器事务。 处理器可以将ECC和存储器事务数据存储到存储器。 处理器可以从存储器加载存储的ECC和数据,并将计算的ECC与存储的ECC进行比较,以检测具有无效安全飞地状态位的存储器事务。 描述和要求保护其他实施例。