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1. 发明授权

US08073766B2 Truth revealing market equilibrium 失效
标题翻译：真相揭示市场均衡
公开(公告)号：US08073766B2
公开(公告)日：2011-12-06
申请号：US12853688
申请日：2010-08-10
申请人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
发明人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
IPC分类号： G06Q40/00
CPC分类号： G06Q30/02 , G06Q30/0251 , G06Q30/0273 , G06Q30/0275 , G06Q30/0277 , G06Q30/08 , G06Q40/00 , G06Q40/04
摘要： To use market clearing methods to determine market equilibrium, a market clearing situation is established by determining a number of items to be sold at the market price and allotting a number of pseudo items assignable to bids below the market price. Once bids are received for the items, using the number of pseudo items and the actual items as the supply side, and the total funds bid as the demand side, a market clearing price is determinable using a market clearing equilibrium model. Funds assigned to pseudo items are returned or not charged. Further, by selling items only to bids exceeding the market clearing price, such as by setting the market price incrementally above the market clearing price, bidders are encouraged to submit bid prices bid reflecting what the items are worth to them instead of attempting to bid strategically to guess or set the market price.
摘要翻译：为了使用市场清算方法来确定市场均衡，通过确定以市场价格出售的物品数量并分配一些低于市场价格的投标价值的伪品，确定市场清算情况。一旦收到项目出价，使用伪项目数量和实际项目作为供应方，总资金出价作为需求方，则使用市场清算均衡模型确定市场结算价格。分配给伪物品的资金将被退回或不收取费用。此外，如果通过将商品出售超过市场清算价格，例如通过将市场价格逐渐高于市场清算价格，则鼓励投标人提交反映出价格的投标价格，而不是尝试策略性地出价猜测或设定市场价格。

2. 发明授权

US07801768B2 Budget-dependent pseudo bid in auction 失效
标题翻译：拍卖中预算相关的伪出价
公开(公告)号：US07801768B2
公开(公告)日：2010-09-21
申请号：US11227545
申请日：2005-09-15
申请人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
发明人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
IPC分类号： G06Q30/00
CPC分类号： G06Q30/08
摘要： In auctioning items, pseudo bids are determined based on the bid price and auction budget submitted by a bidder. The bid associated with the highest pseudo bid is identified as the winning bid. A consistent pseudo bid function is applied to determine the pseudo bids for each of the bids, or a variable pseudo bid function is selectively applied to some bids. The pseudo bid increases with increased bid prices and/or increased auction budgets. When a winning bid is identified, the winner's auction budget is debited the price of the item won, and the pseudo bid is recalculated using the remaining auction budget. Bidders submitting higher auction budgets are rewarded by being able to win more items because their auction budgets increase their pseudo bids. Recalculating pseudo bids based on remaining auction budgets allows different bidders to alternately win successive rounds as previous winners'auction budgets are reduced.
摘要翻译：在拍卖项目中，根据投标人提交的投标价格和拍卖预算确定伪投标。与最高伪投标相关联的出价被标识为中标。应用一致的伪出价功能来确定每个出价的伪出价，或者将可变的模拟出价功能选择性地应用于某些出价。伪出价随着出价价格的上涨和/或增加的拍卖预算而增加。当确定中标时，获胜者的拍卖预算将被扣除所赢取的物品的价格，并使用剩余的拍卖预算重新计算伪出价。投标人提交更高的拍卖预算将因为拍卖预算增加伪出价而获得更多的项目而获得奖励。基于剩余的拍卖预算重新计算伪出价，允许不同的投标人交替地赢得连续的回合，因为先前的赢家预算减少了。

3. 发明申请

US20070061240A1 Truth revealing market equilibrium 失效
标题翻译：真相揭示市场均衡
公开(公告)号：US20070061240A1
公开(公告)日：2007-03-15
申请号：US11227454
申请日：2005-09-15
申请人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
发明人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
IPC分类号： G06Q40/00
CPC分类号： G06Q30/02 , G06Q30/0251 , G06Q30/0273 , G06Q30/0275 , G06Q30/0277 , G06Q30/08 , G06Q40/00 , G06Q40/04
摘要： To use market clearing methods to determine market equilibrium, a market clearing situation is established by determining a number of items to be sold at the market price and allotting a number of pseudo items assignable to bids below the market price. Once bids are received for the items, using the number of pseudo items and the actual items as the supply side, and the total funds bid as the demand side, a market clearing price is determinable using a market clearing equilibrium model. Funds assigned to pseudo items are returned or not charged. Further, by selling items only to bids exceeding the market clearing price, such as by setting the market price incrementally above the market clearing price, bidders are encouraged to submit bid prices bid reflecting what the items are worth to them instead of attempting to bid strategically to guess or set the market price.
摘要翻译：为了使用市场清算方法来确定市场均衡，通过确定以市场价格出售的物品数量并分配一些低于市场价格的投标价值的伪品，确定市场清算情况。一旦收到项目出价，使用伪项目数量和实际项目作为供应方，总资金出价作为需求方，则使用市场清算均衡模型确定市场结算价格。分配给伪物品的资金将被退回或不收取费用。此外，如果通过将商品出售超过市场清算价格，例如通过将市场价格逐渐高于市场清算价格，则鼓励投标人向投标人提交反映价值的投标价格，而不是策略性地出价猜测或设定市场价格。

4. 发明授权

US07958040B2 Online computation of market equilibrium price 有权
标题翻译：在线计算市场均衡价格
公开(公告)号：US07958040B2
公开(公告)日：2011-06-07
申请号：US11145051
申请日：2005-06-03
申请人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
发明人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
IPC分类号： G06Q40/00 , G06Q30/00
CPC分类号： G06Q30/08 , G06Q30/02 , G06Q30/0275 , G06Q40/04
摘要： Auction prices for a quantity of items, the quantity of which is not determined prior to auction, are equilibrated among bidders to reflect supply and demand for the items. For example, in auctioning Internet advertising opportunities, the first available opportunities are auctioned to a high bidder. Later in the course of the auction period, once the high bidder's budget has been exhausted, the price for advertising opportunities is reduced. The difference in price paid by the high bidder and the reduced price for the quantity of advertising opportunities purchased is credited to the high bidder's account. Once the high bidder's account regains a level sufficient to acquire additional advertising opportunities, the high bidder may continue to acquire advertising opportunities. Other bidders similarly are credited the difference between prices previously paid and the current price. An equilibrium price is reached based on the recursive adjustment of prices paid by the bidders.
摘要翻译：在拍卖前未量化的数量的拍卖价格在投标人之间平衡，以反映物品的供应和需求。例如，在拍卖互联网广告机会时，第一个可用的机会被拍卖给高出价者。拍卖期后，一旦投标人的预算用尽，广告机会的价格就会下降。高投标人支付的价格差异和购买广告机会数量的降低价格记入高出价人的账户。一旦高投标人的帐户重新获得足够的水平以获得额外的广告机会，高投标人可能会继续获得广告机会。其他投标人也同样被认为是以前支付的价格与当前价格的差额。基于投标人支付的价格的递归调整，达到均衡价格。

5. 发明申请

US20070106667A1 Generalized deadlock resolution in databases 审中-公开
标题翻译：数据库中的广义死锁解决方案
公开(公告)号：US20070106667A1
公开(公告)日：2007-05-10
申请号：US11271130
申请日：2005-11-10
申请人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar , Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi
发明人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar , Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi
IPC分类号： G06F17/30
CPC分类号： G06F16/2343
摘要： AND/OR graphs representative of database transactions are leveraged to facilitate in providing transaction deadlock resolutions with a guarantee in performance. In one instance, predominantly OR-based transaction deadlocks are resolved via killing a minimum cost set of graph nodes to release associated resources. This process can be performed cyclically to resolve additional deadlocks. This allows a minimal impact approach to resolving deadlocks without requiring wholesale cancellation of all transactions and restarting of entire systems. In another instance, a model is provided that facilitates in resolving deadlocks permanently. In an AND-based transaction case, a bipartite mixed graph is employed to provide a graph representative of adversarially schedulable transactions that can acquire resource locks in any order without deadlocking.
摘要翻译：利用代表数据库事务的AND / OR图来促进提供事务死锁分辨率和性能保证。在一种情况下，主要是基于OR的事务死锁通过杀死图形节点的最小成本集来解除，以释放相关资源。可以循环执行此过程以解决额外的死锁。这样可以实现最小的影响力来解决死锁，而不需要批量取消所有事务并重新启动整个系统。在另一种情况下，提供了有助于永久解决死锁的模型。在基于AND的交易案例中，采用二分混合图来提供代表可以以任何顺序获取资源锁而没有死锁的对话可调度事务的图。

6. 发明申请

US20070038509A1 Budget-based advertisement placement 审中-公开
标题翻译：基于预算的广告刊登位置
公开(公告)号：US20070038509A1
公开(公告)日：2007-02-15
申请号：US11200633
申请日：2005-08-10
申请人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
发明人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
IPC分类号： G06Q30/00
CPC分类号： G06Q30/02 , G06Q30/0249 , G06Q30/0275
摘要： Budget-based advertisement placement is described. Advertisements are selected for display via multiple available ad slots. Click-through prices are calculated for each of the advertisements such that if a particular advertisement is selected by a user, an advertiser is charged the click-through price for that advertisement. The advertisements are assigned to the available ad slots based, at least in part, on budget data associated with the advertisements.
摘要翻译：描述了基于预算的广告布置。通过多个可用的广告位选择广告进行展示。针对每个广告计算点击价格，使得如果用户选择特定广告，则广告商对该广告收取点击价。至少部分地，基于与广告相关联的预算数据，将广告分配给可用的广告位。

7. 发明授权

US07788164B2 Truth revealing market equilibrium 失效
标题翻译：真相揭示市场均衡
公开(公告)号：US07788164B2
公开(公告)日：2010-08-31
申请号：US11227454
申请日：2005-09-15
申请人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
发明人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
IPC分类号： G06Q40/00
CPC分类号： G06Q30/02 , G06Q30/0251 , G06Q30/0273 , G06Q30/0275 , G06Q30/0277 , G06Q30/08 , G06Q40/00 , G06Q40/04
摘要： To use market clearing methods to determine market equilibrium, a market clearing situation is established by determining a number of items to be sold at the market price and allotting a number of pseudo items assignable to bids below the market price. Once bids are received for the items, using the number of pseudo items and the actual items as the supply side, and the total funds bid as the demand side, a market clearing price is determinable using a market clearing equilibrium model. Funds assigned to pseudo items are returned or not charged. Further, by selling items only to bids exceeding the market clearing price, such as by setting the market price incrementally above the market clearing price, bidders are encouraged to submit bid prices bid reflecting what the items are worth to them instead of attempting to bid strategically to guess or set the market price.
摘要翻译：为了使用市场清算方法来确定市场均衡，通过确定以市场价格出售的物品数量并分配一些低于市场价格的投标价值的伪品，确定市场清算情况。一旦收到项目出价，使用伪项目数量和实际项目作为供应方，总资金出价作为需求方，则使用市场清算均衡模型确定市场结算价格。分配给伪物品的资金将被退回或不收取费用。此外，如果通过将商品出售超过市场清算价格，例如通过将市场价格逐渐高于市场清算价格，则鼓励投标人提交反映出价格的投标价格，而不是尝试策略性地出价猜测或设定市场价格。

8. 发明申请

US20060277135A1 Online computation of market equilibrium price 有权
标题翻译：在线计算市场均衡价格
公开(公告)号：US20060277135A1
公开(公告)日：2006-12-07
申请号：US11145051
申请日：2005-06-03
申请人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
发明人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
IPC分类号： G06Q40/00
CPC分类号： G06Q30/08 , G06Q30/02 , G06Q30/0275 , G06Q40/04
摘要： Auction prices for a quantity of items, the quantity of which is not determined prior to auction, are equilibrated among bidders to reflect supply and demand for the items. For example, in auctioning Internet advertising opportunities, the first available opportunities are auctioned to a high bidder. Later in the course of the auction period, once the high bidder's budget has been exhausted, the price for advertising opportunities is reduced. The difference in price paid by the high bidder and the reduced price for the quantity of advertising opportunities purchased is credited to the high bidder's account. Once the high bidder's account regains a level sufficient to acquire additional advertising opportunities, the high bidder may continue to acquire advertising opportunities. Other bidders similarly are credited the difference between prices previously paid and the current price. An equilibrium price is reached based on the recursive adjustment of prices paid by the bidders.
摘要翻译：在拍卖前未量化的数量的拍卖价格在投标人之间平衡，以反映物品的供应和需求。例如，在拍卖互联网广告机会时，第一个可用的机会被拍卖给高出价者。拍卖期后，一旦投标人的预算用尽，广告机会的价格就会下降。高投标人支付的价格差异和购买广告机会数量的降低价格记入高出价人的账户。一旦高投标人的帐户重新获得足够的水平以获得额外的广告机会，高投标人可能会继续获得广告机会。其他投标人也同样被认为是以前支付的价格与当前价格的差额。基于投标人支付的价格的递归调整，达到均衡价格。

9. 发明申请

US20100312651A1 Truth Revealing Market Equilibrium 失效
标题翻译：真相揭示市场平衡
公开(公告)号：US20100312651A1
公开(公告)日：2010-12-09
申请号：US12853688
申请日：2010-08-10
申请人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
发明人： Kamal Jain , Kunal Talwar
IPC分类号： G06Q30/00 , G06Q40/00
CPC分类号： G06Q30/02 , G06Q30/0251 , G06Q30/0273 , G06Q30/0275 , G06Q30/0277 , G06Q30/08 , G06Q40/00 , G06Q40/04
摘要： To use market clearing methods to determine market equilibrium, a market clearing situation is established by determining a number of items to be sold at the market price and allotting a number of pseudo items assignable to bids below the market price. Once bids are received for the items, using the number of pseudo items and the actual items as the supply side, and the total funds bid as the demand side, a market clearing price is determinable using a market clearing equilibrium model. Funds assigned to pseudo items are returned or not charged. Further, by selling items only to bids exceeding the market clearing price, such as by setting the market price incrementally above the market clearing price, bidders are encouraged to submit bid prices bid reflecting what the items are worth to them instead of attempting to bid strategically to guess or set the market price.
摘要翻译：为了使用市场清算方法来确定市场均衡，通过确定以市场价格出售的物品数量并分配一些低于市场价格的投标价值的伪品，确定市场清算情况。一旦收到项目出价，使用伪项目数量和实际项目作为供应方，总资金出价作为需求方，则使用市场清算均衡模型确定市场结算价格。分配给伪物品的资金将被退回或不收取费用。此外，如果通过将商品出售超过市场清算价格，例如通过将市场价格逐渐高于市场清算价格，则鼓励投标人提交反映出价格的投标价格，而不是尝试策略性地出价猜测或设定市场价格。

10. 发明申请

US20070073579A1 Click fraud resistant learning of click through rate 审中-公开
标题翻译：点击欺诈学习点击率
公开(公告)号：US20070073579A1
公开(公告)日：2007-03-29
申请号：US11234476
申请日：2005-09-23
申请人： Nicole Immorlica , Kamal Jain , Mohammad Mahdian , Kunal Talwar
发明人： Nicole Immorlica , Kamal Jain , Mohammad Mahdian , Kunal Talwar
IPC分类号： G06Q30/00
CPC分类号： G06Q30/0248 , G06Q30/0267
摘要： Click-based algorithms are leveraged to provide protection against fraudulent user clicks of online advertisements. This enables mitigation of short term losses due to the fraudulent clicks and also mitigates long term advantages caused by the fraud. The techniques employed utilize “expected click wait” instead of CTR to determine the likelihood that a future click will occur. An expected click wait is based on the number of events that occur before a certain number of clicks are obtained. The events can also include advertisement impressions and/or sale and the like. This flexibility allows for fraud detection of other systems by transforming the other systems to clock-tick fraud based systems. Averages, including weighted averages, can also be utilized with the systems and methods herein to facilitate in providing a fraud resistant estimate of the CTR.
摘要翻译：利用基于点击的算法来提供防止网络广告的欺诈用户点击的保护。这样可以减轻由于欺诈性点击造成的短期损失，并减轻欺诈造成的长期利益。所采用的技术使用“预期点击等待”而不是点击率来确定将来点击的可能性。预期的点击等待是基于获得特定点击次数之前发生的事件数。这些活动还可以包括广告印象和/或销售等。这种灵活性允许通过将其他系统转换为基于时钟滴答讹诈的系统来欺骗其他系统的检测。包括加权平均值在内的平均值也可以与本文的系统和方法一起使用，以便于提供对CTR的欺诈性估计。

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