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    • 1. 发明授权
    • Control of an entity to be controlled by a control entity
    • 控制由控制实体控制的实体
    • US08638940B2
    • 2014-01-28
    • US12747768
    • 2008-12-10
    • Hervé ChabanneJulien BringerThomas Icart
    • Hervé ChabanneJulien BringerThomas Icart
    • H04L9/00
    • H04L9/3271H04L9/302H04L9/3249H04L2209/805
    • A control entity communicates with an entity to be controlled so as to effect a control, a secret key being associated with the control entity. These entities share public parameters, a second public parameter being a combination of a first public parameter of the said plurality with the secret key. At the level of the entity to be controlled, a random value is generated, a first message is transmitted to the control entity, this first message comprising at least one value obtained by combining the first public parameter with the random value; and a second message is transmitted to the control entity, this second message comprising at least one value obtained by combining the first random value, a secret key of the entity to be controlled and a value received from the control entity. One of the values included in the first or the second message is based on the second public parameter.
    • 控制实体与要被控制的实体进行通信,以便实现控制,秘密密钥与控制实体相关联。 这些实体共享公共参数,第二公共参数是所述多个的第一公共参数与秘密密钥的组合。 在要被控制的实体的级别,生成随机值,将第一消息发送到控制实体,该第一消息包括通过将第一公共参数与随机值组合而获得的至少一个值; 并且第二消息被发送到控制实体,该第二消息包括通过组合第一随机值,要被控制的实体的秘密密钥和从控制实体接收的值获得的至少一个值。 包含在第一或第二个消息中的值之一是基于第二个公共参数。
    • 2. 发明申请
    • Control of an Entity to be Controlled by a Control Entity
    • 由控制实体控制的实体的控制
    • US20100284538A1
    • 2010-11-11
    • US12747768
    • 2008-12-10
    • Hervé ChabanneJulien BringerThomas Icart
    • Hervé ChabanneJulien BringerThomas Icart
    • H04L9/00
    • H04L9/3271H04L9/302H04L9/3249H04L2209/805
    • A control entity communicates with an entity to be controlled so as to effect a control, a secret key being associated with the control entity. These entities share public parameters, a second public parameter being a combination of a first public parameter of the said plurality with the secret key. At the level of the entity to be controlled, a random value is generated, a first message is transmitted to the control entity, this first message comprising at least one value obtained by combining the first public parameter with the random value; and a second message is transmitted to the control entity, this second message comprising at least one value obtained by combining the first random value, a secret key of the entity to be controlled and a value received from the control entity. One of the values included in the first or the second message is based on the second public parameter.
    • 控制实体与要被控制的实体进行通信,以便实现控制,秘密密钥与控制实体相关联。 这些实体共享公共参数,第二公共参数是所述多个的第一公共参数与秘密密钥的组合。 在要被控制的实体的级别,生成随机值,将第一消息发送到控制实体,该第一消息包括通过将第一公共参数与随机值组合而获得的至少一个值; 并且第二消息被发送到控制实体,该第二消息包括通过组合第一随机值,要被控制的实体的秘密密钥和从控制实体接收的值获得的至少一个值。 包含在第一或第二个消息中的值之一是基于第二个公共参数。
    • 3. 发明申请
    • METHOD OF EXECUTING A CRYPTOGRAPHIC CALCULATION
    • 执行克氏计算的方法
    • US20110213972A1
    • 2011-09-01
    • US12600197
    • 2008-05-09
    • Herve ChabanneJulien BringerThomas Icart
    • Herve ChabanneJulien BringerThomas Icart
    • H04L9/32H04L9/28
    • H04L9/0866H04L9/0836H04L9/321H04L2209/805
    • A cryptographic calculation is executed in an electronic component, according to a cryptographic algorithm including at least one application of a one-way function which is disabled upon an intrusion into the electronic component. The one-way function is based on a first affine operation corresponding to a first secret key. The one-way function is applied, by obtaining (11) first and second random values (r, r′), then, by obtaining a first result (13) by applying a second affine operation (σK1), which corresponds to a second secret key, to a first combination (12) of the first and second random values, and, by obtaining (14) thereafter a second result by applying a third affine operation (OK2), which corresponds to a third secret key, to said first result. The combination of the third and second affine operations (σK2 o σK1) corresponds to the first affine operation; and a cryptographic operation is moreover applied (15) to one at least among said second result and a second combination of the first and second random values.
    • 根据密码算法,在电子部件中执行加密计算,所述加密算法包括在侵入电子部件时被禁用的单向功能的至少一个应用。 单向功能基于对应于第一秘密密钥的第一仿射操作。 应用单向函数,通过获得(11)第一和第二随机值(r,r'),然后通过应用第二个仿射运算(&sgr; K1)获得第一个结果(13) 第二秘密密钥,第一和第二随机值的第一组合(12),并且通过将对应于第三秘密密钥的第三仿射操作(OK2)应用到第二结果,获得(14)第二结果, 说第一个结果。 第三次和第二次仿射操作的组合(&sgr; K2 o&sgr; K1)对应于第一次仿射操作; 并且至少在所述第二结果和第一和第二随机值的第二组合中至少应用(15)至一个加密操作。
    • 4. 发明授权
    • Method of executing a cryptographic calculation
    • 执行密码计算的方法
    • US08681972B2
    • 2014-03-25
    • US12600197
    • 2008-05-09
    • Herve ChabanneJulien BringerThomas Icart
    • Herve ChabanneJulien BringerThomas Icart
    • G06F21/00
    • H04L9/0866H04L9/0836H04L9/321H04L2209/805
    • A cryptographic calculation is executed in an electronic component, according to a cryptographic algorithm including at least one application of a one-way function which is disabled upon an intrusion into the electronic component. The one-way function is based on a first affine operation corresponding to a first secret key. The one-way function is applied, by obtaining (11) first and second random values (r, r′), then, by obtaining a first result (13) by applying a second affine operation (σK1), which corresponds to a second secret key, to a first combination (12) of the first and second random values, and, by obtaining (14) thereafter a second result by applying a third affine operation (σK2) which corresponds to a third secret key to said first result. The combination of the third and second affine operations (σK1 o σK2) corresponds to the first affine operation; and a cryptographic operation is moreover applied (15) to one at least among said second result and a second combination of the first and second random values.
    • 根据密码算法,在电子部件中执行加密计算,所述加密算法包括在侵入电子部件时被禁用的单向功能的至少一个应用。 单向功能基于对应于第一秘密密钥的第一仿射操作。 应用单向函数,通过获得(11)第一和第二随机值(r,r'),然后通过应用第二个仿射运算(&sgr; K1)获得第一个结果(13) 第二秘密密钥,涉及第一和第二随机值的第一组合(12),并且通过将对应于第三秘密密钥的第三仿射操作(&Sgr; K2)应用于第二结果,获得第二结果(14) 说第一个结果。 第三次和第二次仿射操作(&sgr; K1 o&sgr; K2)的组合对应于第一次仿射操作; 并且至少在所述第二结果和第一和第二随机值的第二组合中至少应用(15)至一个加密操作。
    • 6. 发明申请
    • PROTECTING STATES OF A CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROCESS USING GROUP AUTOMORPHISMS
    • 使用组自动化保护CRIPTOGRAPHIC过程的状态
    • US20120254625A1
    • 2012-10-04
    • US13076362
    • 2011-03-30
    • Augustin J. FARRUGIAMathieu CietThomas Icart
    • Augustin J. FARRUGIAMathieu CietThomas Icart
    • G06F21/24
    • G06F21/602G06F21/52
    • In the field of computer enabled cryptography, such as a keyed block cipher having a plurality of rounds, the cipher is hardened against an attack by a protection process which obscures the cipher states and/or the round keys using the properties of group field automorphisms and applying multiplicative masks (instead of conventional XOR masks) to the states of the cipher, for encryption or decryption. This is especially advantageous in a “White Box” environment where an attacker has full access to the cipher algorithm, including the algorithm's internal state during its execution. This method and the associated computing apparatus are useful for protection against known attacks on “White Box” ciphers, by eliminating XOR operations with improved masking techniques and increasing complexity of reverse engineering and of attacks.
    • 在诸如具有多个回合的密钥分组密码的计算机启用密码学领域中,使用组域自动生成的属性,使密码状态和/或循环密钥隐藏的保护过程针对攻击进行加密, 将乘法掩码(而不是常规XOR掩码)应用于密码的状态,以进行加密或解密。 这在白盒环境中特别有利,在这种情况下,攻击者可以完全访问密码算法,包括算法执行过程中的内部状态。 该方法和相关联的计算设备对于通过利用改进的掩蔽技术消除XOR操作并增加逆向工程和攻击的复杂性来防止已知的对白盒密码的攻击是有用的。
    • 7. 发明申请
    • CRYPTOGRAPHY ON A ELLIPTICAL CURVE
    • 椭圆曲线的曲线图
    • US20120082307A1
    • 2012-04-05
    • US13377404
    • 2010-06-15
    • Thomas IcartJean-Sebastien Coron
    • Thomas IcartJean-Sebastien Coron
    • H04L9/28
    • G06F7/725G06F2207/7261H04L9/3066
    • A cryptographic calculation includes obtaining a point P(X,Y) from a parameter t on an elliptical curve Y2=f(X); and from polynomials X1(t), X2(t), X3(t) and U(t) satisfying: f(X1(t)).f(X2(t)).f(X3(t))=U(t)2 in Fq, with q=3 mod 4. Firstly a value of the parameter t is obtained. Next, the point P is determined by: (i) calculating X1=X1(t), X2=X2(t), X3=X3(t) and U=U(t); (ii) if the term f(X1)·f(X2) is a square, then testing whether the term f(X3) is a square in Fq and if so calculating the square root of f(X3) in order to obtain the point P(X3); (iii) otherwise, testing whether the term f(X1) is a square and, if so, calculating the square root of f(X1) in order to obtain the point P(X1); (iv) otherwise, calculating the square root of f(X2) in order to obtain the point P(X2). This point P is useful in a cryptographic application.
    • 密码计算包括从椭圆曲线Y2 = f(X)上的参数t获得点P(X,Y); 和(x(t))f(X3(t))= U(t(x) t)2,其中q = 3 mod 4.首先获得参数t的值。 接下来,通过以下方式确定点P:(i)计算X1 = X1(t),X2 = X2(t),X3 = X3(t)和U = U(t); (ii)如果术语f(X1)·f(X2)是一个平方,则测试f(X3)是否是Fq中的平方,如果是,则计算f(X3)的平方根,以获得 点P(X3); (iii)否则,测试术语f(X1)是否为平方,如果是,则计算f(X1)的平方根以获得点P(X1); (iv)否则,计算f(X2)的平方根,以获得点P(X2)。 这一点P在加密应用程序中很有用。
    • 9. 发明授权
    • Methods and apparatus for data hashing based on non-linear operations
    • 基于非线性运算的数据散列方法和装置
    • US08832450B2
    • 2014-09-09
    • US13485454
    • 2012-05-31
    • Mathieu CietThomas IcartAugustin J. Farrugia
    • Mathieu CietThomas IcartAugustin J. Farrugia
    • H04L9/32
    • H04L9/0643
    • A method and an apparatus that provides a hard problem based hashing mechanism to improve security of hash functions are described. The hashing mechanism can include a custom padding and/or a post processing to a hashed value strengthened via operations specifying a hard problem. In one embodiment, a new hash function may be provided or defined directly without introducing or relying on existing hash functions to embed security features based on this hard problem. The new hash functions can be used in usual constructions implying hash functions. For example, the standard HMAC construction could be applied on these hash functions, standard signature algorithms or authentication protocol, etc.
    • 描述了提供基于硬问题的散列机制以提高散列函数的安全性的方法和装置。 散列机制可以包括通过指定硬问题的操作来加强散列值的定制填充和/或后处理。 在一个实施例中,可以直接提供或定义新的散列函数,而不引入或依赖现有的散列函数来基于这个难题来嵌入安全特征。 新的哈希函数可以在通常的结构中使用,这意味着散列函数。 例如,标准HMAC结构可以应用于这些散列函数,标准签名算法或认证协议等。