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    • 4. 发明申请
    • TECHNOLOGIES FOR PREVENTING HOOK-SKIPPING ATTACKS USING PROCESSOR VIRTUALIZATION FEATURES
    • 使用处理器虚拟化功能防止跳槽攻击的技术
    • US20150379263A1
    • 2015-12-31
    • US14318215
    • 2014-06-27
    • Harshawardhan VipatManohar R. CastelinoRavi L. SahitaSergio RodriguezVikas Gupta
    • Harshawardhan VipatManohar R. CastelinoRavi L. SahitaSergio RodriguezVikas Gupta
    • G06F21/56
    • G06F21/79G06F21/62
    • Technologies for monitoring system API calls include a computing device with hardware virtualization support. The computing device establishes a default memory view and a security memory view to define physical memory maps and permissions. The computing device executes an application in the default memory view and executes a default inline hook in response to a call to an API function. The default inline hook switches to the security memory view using hardware support without causing a virtual machine exit. The security inline hook calls a security callback function to validate the API function call in the security memory view. Hook-skipping attacks may be prevented by padding the default inline hook with no-operation instructions, by designating memory pages of the API function as non-executable in the default memory view, or by designating memory pages of the application as non-executable in the security memory view. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
    • 用于监视系统API调用的技术包括具有硬件虚拟化支持的计算设备。 计算设备建立默认内存视图和安全内存视图来定义物理内存映射和权限。 计算设备在默认存储器视图中执行应用程序,并响应于对API函数的调用执行默认内联钩子。 默认内联挂钩将使用硬件支持切换到安全内存视图,而不会导致虚拟机退出。 安全内联钩调用安全回调函数来验证安全内存视图中的API函数调用。 通过将默认内存视图中的不可执行的API函数的内存页指定为不可执行的内存页,或者通过将应用程序的内存页指定为不可执行的方式,可以通过使用无操作指令填充默认内联钩来防止跳钩攻击 安全内存视图。 描述和要求保护其他实施例。
    • 9. 发明申请
    • TECHNOLOGIES FOR CONTROL FLOW EXPLOIT MITIGATION USING PROCESSOR TRACE
    • 使用处理器跟踪控制流量开采减少的技术
    • US20160283714A1
    • 2016-09-29
    • US14670988
    • 2015-03-27
    • Michael LeMayRavi L. SahitaBeeman C. StrongThilo SchmittYuriy BulyginMarkus T. Metzger
    • Michael LeMayRavi L. SahitaBeeman C. StrongThilo SchmittYuriy BulyginMarkus T. Metzger
    • G06F21/56G06F21/44
    • G06F21/56G06F21/44G06F21/52
    • Technologies for control flow exploit mitigation include a computing device having a processor with real-time instruction tracing support. During execution of a process, the processor generates trace data indicative of control flow of the process. The computing device analyzes the trace data to identify suspected control flow exploits. The computing device may use heuristic algorithms to identify return-oriented programming exploits. The computing device may maintain a shadow stack based on the trace data. The computing device may identify indirect branches to unauthorized addresses based on the trace data to identify jump-oriented programming exploits. The computing device may check the trace data whenever the process is preempted. The processor may detect mispredicted return instructions in real time and invoke a software handler in the process space of the process to verify and maintain the shadow stack. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
    • 用于控制流利用减轻的技术包括具有具有实时指令跟踪支持的处理器的计算设备。 在处理过程中,处理器产生指示过程控制流的跟踪数据。 计算设备分析跟踪数据以识别可疑的控制流攻击。 计算设备可以使用启发式算法来识别返回导向的编程漏洞。 计算设备可以基于跟踪数据来维护阴影栈。 计算设备可以基于跟踪数据来识别对未授权地址的间接分支,以识别面向跳跃的编程漏洞。 每当进程被抢占时,计算设备可以检查跟踪数据。 处理器可以实时地检测错误的返回指令,并且在该过程的过程空间中调用软件处理程序以验证和维护该影子栈。 描述和要求保护其他实施例。