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    • 3. 发明授权
    • Non-interactive hierarchical identity-based key-agreement
    • 基于非交互式层次化身份的密钥协商
    • US08422681B2
    • 2013-04-16
    • US12043755
    • 2008-03-06
    • Rosario GennaroShai HaleviHugo M KrawczykTal Rabin
    • Rosario GennaroShai HaleviHugo M KrawczykTal Rabin
    • H04L29/06
    • H04L9/0847H04L9/0836H04L2209/80
    • A pairwise key-agreement scheme is provided for creating key agreements non-interactively between pairs of nodes disposed in a hierarchy of nodes. The scheme is non-interactive so that any two nodes can agree on a shared secret key without interaction. In addition, the scheme is identity-based so that any given node only needs to know the identity of peer nodes to compute the shared secret key. All of the nodes are arranged in a hierarchy where an intermediate node in the hierarchy can derive the secret keys for each of its children from its own secret key and the identity of the child. Accordingly, the scheme is fully resilient against compromise of any number of leaves in the hierarchy and of a threshold number of nodes in the upper levels of the hierarchy. The scheme is well-suited for environments such as mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), which are very dynamic, have acute bandwidth-constraints and have many nodes are vulnerable to compromise.
    • 提供了成对密钥协商方案,用于在节点层次结构中的成对节点之间非交互地创建密钥协议。 该方案是非交互式的,因此任何两个节点都可以在没有交互的情况下对共享秘密密钥达成一致。 此外,该方案是基于身份的,使得任何给定节点仅需要知道对等节点的身份来计算共享密钥。 所有的节点被排列在层次结构中,其中层次结构中的中间节点可以从其自己的秘密密钥和孩子的身份导出其每个子项的秘密密钥。 因此,该方案完全可抵御层次结构中任何数量的叶片和层次结构的较高层中的阈值数量的节点的折中。 该方案非常适合诸如移动自组织网络(MANET)这样非常动态的环境,具有严格的带宽限制,并且许多节点容易受到折中。
    • 4. 发明申请
    • Non-Interactive Hierarchical Identity-Based Key-Agreement
    • 非交互式分层身份认证密钥协商
    • US20090225986A1
    • 2009-09-10
    • US12043755
    • 2008-03-06
    • Rosario GennaroShai HaleviHugo M. KrawczykTal Rabin
    • Rosario GennaroShai HaleviHugo M. KrawczykTal Rabin
    • H04L9/08
    • H04L9/0847H04L9/0836H04L2209/80
    • A pairwise key-agreement scheme is provided for creating key agreements non-interactively between pairs of nodes disposed in a hierarchy of nodes. The scheme is non-interactive so that any two nodes can agree on a shared secret key without interaction. In addition, the scheme is identity-based so that any given node only needs to know the identity of peer nodes to compute the shared secret key. All of the nodes are arranged in a hierarchy where an intermediate node in the hierarchy can derive the secret keys for each of its children from its own secret key and the identity of the child. Accordingly, the scheme is fully resilient against compromise of any number of leaves in the hierarchy and of a threshold number of nodes in the upper levels of the hierarchy. The scheme is well-suited for environments such as mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), which are very dynamic, have acute bandwidth-constraints and have many nodes are vulnerable to compromise.
    • 提供了成对密钥协商方案,用于在节点层次结构中的成对节点之间非交互地创建密钥协议。 该方案是非交互式的,因此任何两个节点都可以在没有交互的情况下对共享秘密密钥达成一致。 此外,该方案是基于身份的,使得任何给定节点仅需要知道对等节点的身份来计算共享密钥。 所有的节点被排列在层次结构中,其中层次结构中的中间节点可以从其自己的秘密密钥和孩子的身份导出其每个子项的秘密密钥。 因此,该方案完全可抵御层次结构中任何数量的叶片和层次结构的较高层中的阈值数量的节点的折中。 该方案非常适合诸如移动自组织网络(MANET)这样非常动态的环境,具有严格的带宽限制,并且许多节点容易受到折中。
    • 6. 发明授权
    • Secure hash-and-sign signatures
    • 安全的哈希签名签名
    • US06578144B1
    • 2003-06-10
    • US09274525
    • 1999-03-23
    • Rosario GennaroShai HaleviTal Rabin
    • Rosario GennaroShai HaleviTal Rabin
    • H04L930
    • H04L9/302H04L9/3236H04L9/3249H04L2209/56
    • This invention is a method and apparatus which provide a solution to the problem of constructing efficient and secure digital signature schemes. It presents a signature scheme that can be proven to be existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack, assuming a variant of the RSA conjecture. This scheme is not based on “signature trees”, but instead it uses a “hash-and-sign” paradigm, while maintaining provable security. The security proof is based on well-defined and reasonable assumptions made on the cryptographic hash function in use. In particular, it does not model this function as a random oracle. The signature scheme which is described in this invention is efficient. Further, it is “stateless”, in the sense that the signer does not need to keep any state, other than the secret key, for the purpose of generating signatures.
    • 本发明是提供解决构建有效和安全的数字签名方案的问题的方法和装置。 它提出了一种签名方案,假设RSA推测的变体,可以证明在选择的消息攻击下存在不可伪造的签名方案。 该方案不是基于“签名树”,而是使用“哈希和签名”范例,同时保持可证明的安全性。 安全性证明是基于对正在使用的密码散列函数的明确且合理的假设。 特别是,它不会将这个函数建模成一个随机的oracle。 本发明描述的签名方案是有效的。 此外,它是“无国籍的”,在某种意义上,为了生成签名,签名者不需要保留除秘密密钥之外的任何状态。
    • 7. 发明授权
    • Method and apparatus for providing interoperability between key recovery and non-key recovery systems
    • US06535607B1
    • 2003-03-18
    • US09184002
    • 1998-11-02
    • Coimbatore S. ChandersekaranRosario GennaroSarbari GuptaStephen M. Matyas, Jr.David R. SaffordNevenko Zunic
    • Coimbatore S. ChandersekaranRosario GennaroSarbari GuptaStephen M. Matyas, Jr.David R. SaffordNevenko Zunic
    • H04L900
    • H04L9/0841H04L9/0894
    • A method and apparatus for ensuring that a key recovery-enabled (KR-enabled) system communicating with a non-KR-enabled system in a cryptographic communication system transmits the information necessary to permit key recovery by a key recovery entity. In a first embodiment, data is encrypted under a second key K that is generated as a one-way function of a first key K′ and a key recovery block KRB generated on the first key K′. The key recovery block KRB and the encrypted data e(K, data) are transmitted to the receiver, who cannot decrypt the data without regenerating the second key K from the first key K′ and the key recovery block KRB. In a second embodiment, data is encrypted under a second key K that is generated independently of the first key K′. A third key X, generated as a one-way function of the first key K′ and a key recovery block KRB generated on the second key K, is used to encrypt the XOR product Y of the first and second keys K′, K. The key recovery block KRB, the encrypted XOR product e(X, Y) and the encrypted data e(K, data) are transmitted to the receiver, who cannot decrypt the data without regenerating the third key X from the first key K′ and the key recovery block KRB, decrypting the XOR product Y using the regenerated third key X, and recombining the XOR product Y with the first key K″ to regenerate the second key K. In a third embodiment, an integrity value is computed on a key K and its key recovery block KRB. The integrity value and the key K are encrypted to form an encrypted portion of a key exchange block KEB, while the key recovery block KRB is put in an unencrypted portion of the key exchange block KEB, which is sent along with the encrypted data e(K, data) to the receiver. The receiver decrypts the encrypted portion, recomputes the integrity value and compares it with the received integrity value. Only if the two integrity values compare is the key K extracted and used to decrypt the data.