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    • 12. 发明申请
    • TECHNOLOGIES FOR SECURE PROGRAMMING OF A CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINE FOR SECURE I/O
    • 用于安全I / O的CRYPTOGRAPHIC发动机的安全技术
    • WO2017014889A1
    • 2017-01-26
    • PCT/US2016/038396
    • 2016-06-20
    • INTEL CORPORATION
    • CHHABRA, SiddharthaGERZON, GideonLAL, ReshmaXING, BinPAPPACHAN, Pradeep M.MCGOWAN, Steven B.
    • G06F21/60
    • G06F21/72G06F21/57H04L9/0822H04L9/0861H04L9/3242
    • Technologies for secure programming of a cryptographic engine include a computing device with a cryptographic engine and one or more I/O controllers. The computing device establishes, an invoking secure enclave using secure enclave support of a processor. The invoking enclave configures channel programming information, including a channel key, and invokes a processor instruction with the channel programming information as a parameter. The processor generates wrapped programming information including an encrypted channel key and a message authentication code. The encrypted channel key is protected with a key known only to the processor. The invoking enclave provides the wrapped programming information to untrusted software, which invokes a processor instruction with the wrapped programming information as a parameter. The processor unwraps and verifies the wrapped programming information and then programs the cryptographic engine. The processor generates an authenticated response that may be verified by the invoking enclave. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
    • 用于加密引擎的安全编程的技术包括具有密码引擎和一个或多个I / O控制器的计算设备。 计算设备使用处理器的安全飞地支持来建立调用安全飞地。 调用飞地配置信道编程信息,包括信道密钥,并且以通道编程信息为参数来调用处理器指令。 处理器产生包括加密的信道密钥和消息认证码的包装节目信息。 加密的通道密钥由仅对处理器已知的密钥进行保护。 调用的包层将包装的编程信息提供给不受信任的软件,该软件以包装的编程信息作为参数调用处理器指令。 处理器解封装并验证封装的编程信息,然后对加密引擎进行编程。 处理器生成可以通过调用飞地验证的认证响应。 描述和要求保护其他实施例。
    • 13. 发明申请
    • CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION OF I/O DATA FOR DMA CAPABLE I/O CONTROLLERS
    • 用于DMA能力I / O控制器的I / O数据的保护
    • WO2017014885A1
    • 2017-01-26
    • PCT/US2016/038389
    • 2016-06-20
    • INTEL CORPORATION
    • LAL, ReshmaMCGOWAN, Steven B.CHHABRA, SiddharthaGERZON, GideonXING, BinPAPPACHAN, Pradeep M.ELBAZ, Reouven
    • G06F21/60G06F13/28
    • H04L9/0631G06F13/28H04L9/0618H04L9/0822H04L9/3242
    • Technologies for cryptographic protection of I/O data include a computing device with one or more I/O controllers. Each I/O controller may be coupled to one or more I/O devices. Each I/O controller may generate a direct memory access (DMA) transaction that includes a channel identifier that is indicative of the I/O controller and that is indicative of an I/O device coupled to the I/O controller. The computing device intercepts the DMA transaction and determines whether to protect the DMA transaction as a function of the channel identifier. If so, the computing device performs a cryptographic operation using an encryption key associated with the channel identifier. The computing device may include a cryptographic engine that intercepts the DMA transaction and determines whether to protect the DMA transaction by determining whether the channel identifier matches an entry in a channel identifier table of the cryptographic engine. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
    • 用于I / O数据加密保护的技术包括具有一个或多个I / O控制器的计算设备。 每个I / O控制器可以耦合到一个或多个I / O设备。 每个I / O控制器可以生成包括指示I / O控制器并且指示耦合到I / O控制器的I / O设备的信道标识符的直接存储器访问(DMA)事务。 计算设备拦截DMA事务,并根据信道标识确定是否保护DMA事务。 如果是这样,则计算设备使用与该信道标识符相关联的加密密钥来执行密码操作。 计算设备可以包括密码引擎,其拦截DMA事务并且通过确定信道标识符是否匹配密码引擎的信道标识符表中的条目来确定是否保护DMA事务。 描述和要求保护其他实施例。
    • 18. 发明申请
    • TECHNOLOGIES FOR INTEGRITY, ANTI-REPLAY, AND AUTHENTICITY ASSURANCE FOR I/O DATA
    • 技术对于I / O数据的完整性,反复认证和认证保证
    • WO2017014890A1
    • 2017-01-26
    • PCT/US2016/038397
    • 2016-06-20
    • INTEL CORPORATION
    • PAPPACHAN, Pradeep M.LAL, ReshmaXING, BinMCGOWAN, Steven B.CHHABRA, SiddharthaELBAZ, Reouven
    • G06F21/60G06F13/28
    • G06F21/602G06F13/28G06F17/30371G06F21/606G06F21/64G06F2221/031
    • Technologies for authenticity assurance for I/O data include a computing device with a cryptographic engine and one or more I/O controllers. A metadata producer of the computing device performs an authenticated encryption operation on I/O data to generate encrypted I/O data and an authentication tag. The metadata producer stores the encrypted I/O data in a DMA buffer and the authentication tag in an authentication tag queue. A metadata consumer decrypts the encrypted I/O data from the DMA buffer and determines whether the encrypted I/O data is authentic using the authentication tag from the authentication tag queue. For input, the metadata producer may be embodied as the cryptographic engine and the metadata consumer may be embodied as a trusted software component. For output, the metadata producer may be embodied as the trusted software component and the metadata consumer may be embodied as the cryptographic engine. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
    • 用于I / O数据的真实性保证的技术包括具有加密引擎和一个或多个I / O控制器的计算设备。 计算设备的元数据生成器对I / O数据执行认证加密操作以产生加密的I / O数据和认证标签。 元数据生成器将加密的I / O数据存储在DMA缓冲器中,认证标签存储在认证标签队列中。 元数据消费者从DMA缓冲器解密加密的I / O数据,并使用来自认证标签队列的认证标签来确定加密的I / O数据是否是真实的。 对于输入,元数据生成器可以体现为加密引擎,并且元数据消费者可以被实现为可信软件组件。 对于输出,元数据生成器可以被实现为可信软件组件,并且元数据消费者可以被体现为密码引擎。 描述和要求保护其他实施例。
    • 19. 发明申请
    • TECHNOLOGIES FOR SECURE HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE ATTESTATION FOR TRUSTED I/O
    • 用于硬件和硬件安全的技术用于受信任的I / O
    • WO2017014888A1
    • 2017-01-26
    • PCT/US2016/038395
    • 2016-06-20
    • INTEL CORPORATION
    • PAPPACHAN, Pradeep M.LAL, ReshmaXING, BinCHHABRA, SiddharthaSCARLATA, Vincent R.MCGOWAN, Steven B.
    • G06F21/44G06F21/50G06F21/60
    • G06F21/602G06F13/28G06F21/57
    • Technologies for trusted I/O attestation and verification include a computing device with a cryptographic engine and one or more I/O controllers. The computing device collects hardware attestation information associated with statically attached hardware I/O components that are associated with a trusted I/O usage protected by the cryptographic engine. The computing device verifies the hardware attestation information and securely enumerates one or more dynamically attached hardware components in response to verification. The computing device collects software attestation information for trusted software components loaded during secure enumeration. The computing device verifies the software attestation information. The computing device may collect firmware attestation information for firmware loaded in the I/O controllers and verify the firmware attestation information. The computing device may collect application attestation information for a trusted application that uses the trusted I/O usage and verify the application attestation information. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
    • 用于可信I / O认证和验证的技术包括具有加密引擎和一个或多个I / O控制器的计算设备。 计算设备收集与由加密引擎保护的受信任的I / O使用相关联的静态附接的硬件I / O组件相关联的硬件认证信息。 计算设备验证硬件认证信息并且响应于验证安全地枚举一个或多个动态附加的硬件组件。 计算设备收集在安全枚举期间加载的可信软件组件的软件认证信息。 计算设备验证软件认证信息。 计算设备可以收集加载在I / O控制器中的固件的固件证明信息,并验证固件证明信息。 计算设备可以收集使用可信I / O使用的可信应用的应用认证信息,并验证应用认证信息。 描述和要求保护其他实施例。
    • 20. 发明申请
    • TECHNOLOGIES FOR SECURE TRUSTED I/O ACCESS CONTROL
    • 安全有效的I / O访问控制技术
    • WO2017014887A1
    • 2017-01-26
    • PCT/US2016/038394
    • 2016-06-20
    • INTEL CORPORATION
    • XING, BinPAPPACHAN, Pradeep M.CHHABRA, SiddharthaLAL, ReshmaMCGOWAN, Steven B.
    • G06F21/60G06F13/28
    • G06F21/602G06F13/28G06F21/57
    • Technologies for trusted I/O (TIO) include a computing device with a cryptographic engine and one or more I/O controllers. The computing device executes a TIO core service that has a cryptographic engine programming privileged granted by an operating system. The TIO core service receives a request from an application to protect a DMA channel. The TIO core service requests the operating system to protect the DMA channel, and the operating system verifies the cryptographic engine programming privilege of the TIO core service in response. The operating system programs the cryptographic engine to protect the DMA channel in response to verifying the cryptographic engine programming privilege of the TIO core service. If a privileged delegate determines that a user has confirmed termination of protection of the DMA channel, the TIO core service may unprotect the DMA channel. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
    • 可信任I / O(TIO)技术包括具有加密引擎和一个或多个I / O控制器的计算设备。 计算设备执行具有由操作系统许可的密码引擎编程的TIO核心服务。 TIO核心服务接收来自应用程序的请求以保护DMA通道。 TIO核心服务请求操作系统保护DMA通道,操作系统会对TIO核心服务的加密引擎编程权限进行验证。 响应于验证TIO核心服务的加密引擎编程权限,操作系统对加密引擎进行编程以保护DMA通道。 如果特权委托确定用户已经确认终止对DMA通道的保护,TIO核心服务可能会取消保护DMA通道。 描述和要求保护其他实施例。