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    • 73. 发明申请
    • METHOD SECURED AGAINST SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS PERFORMING AN ARITHMETIC OPERATION OF A CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM MIXING BOOLEAN AND ARITHMETIC OPERATIONS
    • WO2019201944A1
    • 2019-10-24
    • PCT/EP2019/059836
    • 2019-04-16
    • THALES DIS FRANCE SA
    • VIGILANT, David
    • H04L9/00
    • The present invention relates to a method secured against side channel attacks performing an arithmetic operation of a cryptographic algorithm mixing Boolean and arithmetic operations, wherein said method is performed by a cryptographic device comprising a processing system having at least one hardware processor, and said operation has a first value (x) and a second value (y) as operands, comprising : - obtaining (S1) a first masked value (x'), a second masked value (y'), a first Boolean mask (r x ), a second Boolean mask (r y ), said first masked value (x') resulting from masking said first value (x) by said first Boolean mask (r x ) by performing a Boolean exclusive OR (XOR) operation between said first value (x) and said first Boolean mask (r x ), and said second masked value (y') resulting from masking said second value (y) by said second Boolean mask (r y ) by performing a Boolean exclusive OR (XOR) operation between said second value (y) and said second Boolean mask (r y ), - performing (S2) in any order a plurality of computing steps combining values among said first masked value (x'), said second masked value (y'), said first Boolean mask (r x ) and said second Boolean mask (r y ) to obtain a boolean masked result equal to the result of the arithmetic operation having said first value (x) and said second value (y) as operands, masked by a third boolean mask (r x xor r y ) resulting from performing said Boolean exclusive OR (XOR) operation between said first Boolean mask (r x ) and said second Boolean mask (r y ) ((x + y) xor (r x xor r y )), wherein said computing steps perform Boolean exclusive OR (XOR) operations or arithmetic operations between said values without disclosing any information relative to the first and second values and, wherein said computing steps are executed by the hardware processor by performing a constant number of elementary operations whatever the bit-size of said first and second values, - outputting (S3) said boolean masked result of the arithmetic operation between said first value (x) and said second value (y).
    • 76. 发明申请
    • PERSONALIZABLE COLOR-SHIFTING DATA CARRIER
    • WO2022112264A1
    • 2022-06-02
    • PCT/EP2021/082714
    • 2021-11-23
    • THALES DIS FRANCE SA
    • DAVOINE, LaurentHAAS, Christopher Knud
    • B42D25/324B42D25/373B42D25/351B42D25/29B42D25/425B42D25/41
    • A data carrier (1) comprises at least one optically variable element (2), at least one surface element (3a), and at least one security element (4) comprising at least part of the at least one optically variable element (2) and at least part of the at least one surface element (3a). The at least one surface element (3a) is configured to guide impinging electromagnetic radiation (EM) towards the at least one optically variable element (2). The data carrier (1) is configured such, that electromagnetic radiation (EM) is impinging on the at least one surface element (3a) under at least a first arrival angle (α1) when the data carrier (1) is seen under a first observation angle (γ1), and such, that electromagnetic radiation (EM) is impinging on the at least one surface element (3a) under at least a second arrival angle (β1) being different from the first arrival angle (α1) when the data carrier (1) is seen under a second observation angle (γ2) being different from the first observation angle (γ1). The at least one optically variable element (2) is configured to reflect at least a first reflection spectrum (R1a) upon impingement of the electromagnetic radiation (EM) being impinging on the at least one surface element (3a) under the first arrival angle (α1), whereby the at least one security element (4) appears according to at least a first appearance (A1a), and is further configured to reflect at least a second reflection spectrum (R2a) upon impingement of the electromagnetic radiation (EM) being impinging on the at least one surface element (3a) under the second arrival angle (β1), whereby the at least one security element (4) appears according to at least a second appearance (A2a) being different from the first appearance (A1a).
    • 79. 发明申请
    • A METHOD FOR SENDING A MESSAGE FROM A REMOTE SERVER TO A TERMINAL
    • WO2022058156A1
    • 2022-03-24
    • PCT/EP2021/073966
    • 2021-08-31
    • THALES DIS FRANCE SA
    • PHAN, Ly ThanGROS, Jean-FrancoisDANY, Vincent
    • H04W12/04
    • The present invention relates to a method for sending a message (MSG) from a remote server (11) to a terminal (10), the remote server (11) and the terminal (10) sharing a secret key (K1), the method comprising: i- Sending from the terminal (10) to the remote server (11) a first identity (UID1); ii- Retrieving at the remote server (11) the first identity (UID1) and retrieving the secret key (K1) based on the first identity (UID1); iii- At the remote server (11), choosing a random number (UID_RAND) and generating a second identity (UID2) thanks to the first identity (UID1), the random number (UID_RAND) and the secret key (K1); iv- At the remote server (11), generating a signature (SIG) from the first identity (UID1), the message (MSG), a counter value (Sent), the random number (UID_RAND) and the secret key (K1); v- At the remote server (11), generating a first response (Resp1) for the terminal (10), the15 first response (Resp1) being a concatenation of the message (MSG), a counter value (Sent), the signature (SIG) and the random number (UID_RAND), and ciphering the first response (Resp1) with the secret key (K1) and sending the first ciphered response (Resp1*) to the terminal (10); vi- At the terminal (10), deciphering the first ciphered response (Resp1*) with the secret key (K1) to obtain the first response (Resp1), retrieving the message (MSG), the counter value (Sent), the signature (SIG) and the random number (UID_RAND), deriving the expected signature (XSIG) of the first response (Resp1), verifying that the signature (SIG) is equal to the expected signature (XSIG) and verifying that the counter value (Sent) is correct, and if it is correct, derive the second identity (UID2) from the first identity (UID1), the secret key (K1) and the random number (UID_RAND).