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    • 71. 发明申请
    • Binding White-Box Implementation To Reduced Secure Element
    • 绑定白盒实现减少安全元素
    • US20160182472A1
    • 2016-06-23
    • US14577148
    • 2014-12-19
    • NXP B.V.
    • Wil MichielsJan Hoogerbrugge
    • H04L29/06
    • H04L63/061H04L9/002H04L63/0876H04L2209/16
    • A non-transitory machine-readable storage medium encoded with instructions for a keyed cryptographic operation having a first and second portion for execution by a cryptographic system mapping an input message to an output message, including: instructions for outputting first cryptographic data from a first portion the cryptographic operation to a secure hardware device implementing a secure function on the data; instructions for receiving output data from the secure hardware device; instructions for implementing an inverse of the secure function on the output data; and instructions for performing a second portion of the cryptographic operation on the inverted output data, wherein the instructions for implementing an inverse of the secure function on the output data are securely merged with the instructions for performing the second portion of the cryptographic operation on the inverted output data so that the inverted output is not accessible to an attacker.
    • 一种编码具有用于密钥密码操作的指令的非暂时机读存储介质,具有用于由映射输入消息到输出消息的加密系统执行的第一和第二部分,包括:用于从第一部分输出第一加密数据的指令 对在数据上实现安全功能的安全硬件设备的加密操作; 用于从安全硬件设备接收输出数据的指令; 用于实现对输出数据的安全功能的反向的指令; 以及用于对所述反相输出数据执行所述密码操作的第二部分的指令,其中用于对所述输出数据执行所述安全功能的逆的所述指令与所述用于执行所述反转的所述加密操作的所述第二部分的指令安全地合并 输出数据,使得反向输出不能被攻击者访问。
    • 72. 发明申请
    • PRIVACY PRESERVING SET-BASED BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION
    • 隐私保护设置为基础的生物识别
    • US20160164682A1
    • 2016-06-09
    • US14560435
    • 2014-12-04
    • FUJITSU LIMITED
    • Jesse HARTLOFFAvradip MANDALArnab ROY
    • H04L9/32H04L29/06G06F21/32
    • H04L9/3231G06F21/32G06K9/00073G06K9/00885G06K9/00926G06K2009/00953H04L9/3026H04L9/304H04L9/3271H04L63/0861H04L2209/16
    • A method includes extracting a set of enrollment feature points from an enrollment biometric measurement. The method also includes randomly selecting one or more enrollment code words from an error correction code. The method also includes determining obfuscated enrollment feature point data describing an obfuscated version of the set of feature points that is obfuscated using the one or more enrollment code words. The method also includes determining obfuscated enrollment code word data describing an obfuscated version of the one or more enrollment code words that is obfuscated using a random enrollment polynomial. The method also includes determining an enrollment biometric template including the obfuscated enrollment feature point data and the obfuscated enrollment code word data. The method also includes determining enrollment data including the enrollment biometric template. The enrollment data may be configured to keep the one or more enrollment code words and the random enrollment polynomial secret.
    • 一种方法包括从注册生物测量测量中提取一组注册特征点。 该方法还包括从纠错码随机选择一个或多个注册码字。 该方法还包括确定使用一个或多个注册码字来模糊的特征点集合的混淆版本的混淆注册特征点数据。 该方法还包括确定描述使用随机注册多项式进行混淆的一个或多个注册码字的混淆版本的混淆注册码字数据。 该方法还包括确定包括混淆的注册特征点数据和混淆的注册码字数据的注册生物识别模板。 该方法还包括确定包括登记生物识别模板的登记数据。 注册数据可以被配置为保持一个或多个注册码字和随机注册多项式秘密。
    • 75. 发明授权
    • FPGA configuration bitstream protection using multiple keys
    • FPGA配置比特流保护使用多个密钥
    • US09208357B1
    • 2015-12-08
    • US14471574
    • 2014-08-28
    • Altera Corporation
    • Martin LanghammerJuju JoyceKeone StreicherDavid JeffersonSrinivas ReddyNitin Prasad
    • G06F21/00G06F21/76H04L9/06H04L9/14G06F21/60
    • H04L9/065G06F21/60G06F21/76H04L9/0877H04L9/14H04L2209/12H04L2209/16H04L2209/26
    • Circuits, methods, and apparatus that prevent detection and erasure of encoding or encryption keys. These encoding keys may be used to encode a configuration bitstream or other data for an FPGA or other device. An exemplary embodiment of the present invention masks a first key to form an encoding key in order to prevent detection of the first key. In a specific embodiment, the first key is encoded using a second key. The encoded key is used to encode a configuration bitstream or other data. The encoded key is stored on an FPGA or other device. When the device is to be configured, the encoded key is retrieved and used to decode the bitstream or other data. A further embodiment stores an encryption key in a one-time programmable memory (OTP) array to prevent its erasure or modification. The encoding key may be further obfuscated before storage.
    • 阻止检测和擦除编码或加密密钥的电路,方法和装置。 这些编码密钥可以用于对配置比特流或FPGA或其他设备的其他数据进行编码。 本发明的示例性实施例掩蔽第一密钥以形成编码密钥,以便防止第一密钥的检测。 在具体实施例中,使用第二密钥对第一密钥进行编码。 编码密钥用于对配置比特流或其他数据进行编码。 编码密钥存储在FPGA或其他设备上。 当要配置设备时,将检索编码密钥并将其用于解码比特流或其他数据。 另一实施例将加密密钥存储在一次性可编程存储器(OTP)阵列中以防止其擦除或修改。 在存储之前可以进一步模糊编码密钥。
    • 79. 发明授权
    • Message sending/receiving method
    • 消息发送/接收方式
    • US09160728B2
    • 2015-10-13
    • US13969532
    • 2013-08-17
    • INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES COPORATION
    • Satoshi Hada
    • H04L29/06H04L9/32H04L12/58H04L9/00
    • H04L63/08H04L9/002H04L9/3247H04L9/3249H04L51/00H04L63/0428H04L63/06H04L2209/08H04L2209/16
    • Signature generation key sk_s is randomized with random number r to calculate randomized signature generation key sk′_s=SigningKeyRandomize(sk_s, r). The random number r is encrypted with public encryption key pk_e to calculate an encrypted random number R=Enc(pk_e, r)). A message m is signed with the randomized signature generation key sk′_s to calculate signed message s′=Sign(sk′_s, m). The signed message s′ and the encrypted random number R are sent to a recipient, where sk_s represents the secret signature generation key of a sender of the message m, pk_e represents the public encryption key of the recipient, r represents the random number, s represents a signature, Sign represents a signature generation function, s=Sign(sk_s, m) represents a signature for the message m, SigningKeyRandomize represents a function for randomizing the secret signature generation key sk_s, and Enc represents an encryption function.
    • 签名生成密钥sk_s随机数r随机化以计算随机签名生成密钥sk'_s = SigningKeyRandomize(sk_s,r)。 随机数r用公共加密密钥pk_e加密,以计算加密的随机数R = Enc(pk_e,r))。 消息m与随机签名生成密钥sk'_s签名,以计算签名消息s'= Sign(sk'_s,m)。 签名的消息s'和加密的随机数R被发送到接收方,其中sk_s表示消息m的发送者的秘密签名生成密钥,pk_e表示接收方的公共加密密钥,r表示随机数s 表示签名,Sign表示签名生成函数,s = Sign(sk_s,m)表示消息m的签名,SigningKeyRandomize表示用于随机化秘密签名生成密钥sk_s的功能,Enc表示加密功能。
    • 80. 发明申请
    • SYSTEM AND METHODS FOR SILENCING HARDWARE BACKDOORS
    • 用于固定硬件背景的系统和方法
    • US20150270952A1
    • 2015-09-24
    • US14671905
    • 2015-03-27
    • Lakshminarasimhan SETHUMADHAVANAdam WAKSMAN
    • Lakshminarasimhan SETHUMADHAVANAdam WAKSMAN
    • H04L9/00
    • H04L9/002G06F21/76H04L9/008H04L2209/16
    • Methods for preventing activation of hardware backdoors installed in a digital circuit, the digital circuit comprising one or more hardware units to be protected. A timer is repeatedly initiated for a period less than a validation epoch, and the hardware units are reset upon expiration of the timer to prevent activation of a time-based backdoor. Data being sent to the hardware unit is encrypted in an encryption element to render it unrecognizable to a single-shot cheat code hardware backdoor present in the hardware unit. The instructions being sent to the hardware unit are reordered randomly or pseudo-randomly, with determined sequential restraints, using an reordering element, to render an activation instruction sequence embedded in the instructions unrecognizable to a sequence cheat code hardware backdoor present in the hardware unit.
    • 用于防止安装在数字电路中的硬件后门的激活的方法,所述数字电路包括要被保护的一个或多个硬件单元。 定时器在小于验证时期的周期内重复启动,并且硬件单元在计时器到期时复位,以防止启动基于时间的后门。 被发送到硬件单元的数据在加密元素中被加密,以使它无法识别到存在于硬件单元中的单一作弊代码硬件后门。 发送到硬件单元的指令被随机地或伪随机地重新排序,使用重新排序元素确定的顺序限制来呈现嵌入在硬件单元中存在的序列作弊码硬件后门的无法识别的指令中的激活指令序列。