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    • 73. 发明申请
    • CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY CONTAINERS ON A USB TOKEN
    • USB TOKEN上的CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY CONTAINERS
    • US20080181412A1
    • 2008-07-31
    • US11627466
    • 2007-01-26
    • Tolga AcarCarl M. Ellison
    • Tolga AcarCarl M. Ellison
    • H04L9/08
    • G06F21/6209G06F21/79H04L9/0897
    • A Universal Serial Bus (USB) compatible storage device is utilized as a security token for storage of cryptographic keys. A cryptographic subsystem of a processor accesses cryptographic keys in containers on the USB compatible storage device. Accessing includes storing and/or retrieving. The processor does not include an infrastructure dedicated to the USB compatible storage device. Cryptographic key storage is redirected from an in-processor container to the USB compatible storage device. No password or PIN is required to access the cryptographic keys, yet enhanced security is provided. Utilizing a USB compatible storage device for a cryptographic key container provides a convenient, portable, mechanism for carrying the cryptographic key, and additional security is provided via physical possession of the device.
    • 通用串行总线(USB)兼容存储设备被用作存储加密密钥的安全令牌。 处理器的加密子系统访问USB兼容存储设备上的容器中的加密密钥。 访问包括存储和/或检索。 处理器不包括专用于USB兼容存储设备的基础设施。 加密密钥存储从处理器内容器重定向到USB兼容的存储设备。 不需要密码或密码来访问加密密钥,但提供了增强的安全性。 利用用于加密密钥容器的USB兼容存储设备提供用于携带加密密钥的便利的便携式机制,并且通过物理拥有该设备来提供额外的安全性。
    • 79. 发明授权
    • System and method for data recovery
    • 用于数据恢复的系统和方法
    • US5991406A
    • 1999-11-23
    • US62748
    • 1998-04-20
    • Steven B. LipnerDavid M. BalensonCarl M. EllisonStephen T. Walker
    • Steven B. LipnerDavid M. BalensonCarl M. EllisonStephen T. Walker
    • G09C1/00H04L9/08H04L9/32H04L9/00
    • H04L9/3271H04L9/0894
    • A system and method for data escrow cryptography are described. An encrypting user encrypts a message using a secret storage key (KS) and attaches a data recovery field (DRF), including an access rule index (ARI) and KS, to the encrypted message. The DRF and the encrypted message are stored in a storage device. To recover KS, a decrypting user extracts and sends the DRF to a data recovery center (DRC) that issues a challenge based on access rules (ARs) originally defined by the encrypting user. If the decrypting user meets the challenge, the DRC sends KS in a message to the decrypting user. Generally, KS need not be an encryption key but could represent any piece of confidential information that can fit inside the DRF. In all cases, the DRC limits access to decrypting users who can meet the challenge defined in either the ARs defined by the encrypting user or the ARs defined for override access.
    • 描述了用于数据托管密码术的系统和方法。 加密用户使用秘密存储密钥(KS)加密消息,并将包括访问规则索引(ARI)和KS的数据恢复字段(DRF)附加到加密消息。 DRF和加密消息存储在存储设备中。 为了恢复KS,解密用户提取并发送DRF到基于由加密用户最初定义的访问规则(AR)发出挑战的数据恢复中心(DRC)。 如果解密用户满足挑战,则DRC将消息中的KS发送给解密用户。 通常,KS不需要加密密钥,但可以代表可以适合DRF内部的任何机密信息。 在所有情况下,DRC限制对可以满足加密用户定义的AR或为覆盖访问定义的AR定义的挑战的解密用户的访问。
    • 80. 发明授权
    • System and method for access field verification
    • 用于访问字段验证的系统和方法
    • US5956403A
    • 1999-09-21
    • US874459
    • 1997-06-16
    • Steven B. LipnerDavid M. BalensonCarl M. EllisonStephen T. Walker
    • Steven B. LipnerDavid M. BalensonCarl M. EllisonStephen T. Walker
    • H04L9/08H04L9/32H04L9/00
    • H04L9/0894
    • A system and method for key escrow cryptography for use in a system comprising a sender and a receiver. Only public escrow keys are stored in the sender and the receiver. The sender encrypts a message using a secret session key (KS), and generates a leaf verification string (LVS) by combining an unique program identifier (UIP), a public portion of a program unique key (KUpub), and a signature. The sender encrypts the KS using the KUpub to generate a first encrypted session key (EKS), and generates a first law enforcement access field (LEAF) by encrypting a combination of the first EKS and the UIP with a copy of a public portion of a family key (KFpub) stored in the sender. The encrypted message, the LVS, and the first LEAF are transmitted from the sender to the receiver. The receiver stores therein a public portion of the KEPF key (KEPFpub). The receiver extracts the UIP, KUpub, and the signature from the LVS, and then encrypts the KS using the extracted KUpub to generate a second encrypted session key (EKS). The receiver generates a second LEAF by encrypting a combination of the second EKS and the extracted UIP with a copy of the KFpub stored in the receiver. The receiver then compares the first LEAF to the second LEAF. If the first LEAF is equal to the second LEAF, then the receiver decrypts the encrypted message using the KS.
    • 一种用于在包括发送器和接收器的系统中使用的密钥代管密码术的系统和方法。 只有公共托管密钥存储在发件人和接收者中。 发送方使用秘密会话密钥(KS)对消息进行加密,并通过组合唯一程序标识符(UIP),程序唯一密钥(KUpub)的公共部分和签名来生成叶验证字符串(LVS)。 发送者使用KUpub加密KS以生成第一加密会话密钥(EKS),并且通过用第一执行访问字段(LEAF)的公共部分的副本加密第一EKS和UIP的组合来生成第一执法访问字段(LEAF) 家庭密钥(KFpub)存储在发件人中。 加密消息,LVS和第一LEAF从发送方发送到接收方。 接收器在其中存储KEPF密钥(KEPFpub)的公共部分。 接收方从LVS提取UIP,KUpub和签名,然后使用提取的KUpub对KS进行加密,生成第二个加密会话密钥(EKS)。 接收器通过用存储在接收器中的KFpub的副本加密第二EKS和提取的UIP的组合来生成第二LEAF。 然后,接收器将第一LEAF与第二LEAF进行比较。 如果第一个LEAF等于第二个LEAF,则接收者使用KS解密加密的消息。