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    • 41. 发明申请
    • REVOCATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC DIGITAL CERTIFICATES
    • US20090265547A1
    • 2009-10-22
    • US12492898
    • 2009-06-26
    • Craig B. GentryZulfikar Amin RamzanBerhard Bruhn
    • Craig B. GentryZulfikar Amin RamzanBerhard Bruhn
    • H04L9/00
    • H04L9/3265H04L9/3236H04L63/0823H04L2209/38H04L2209/56H04L2209/80
    • Different targets (c0, N1) of a digital certificate are mapped into a “super-target” using methods allowing a certificate validity verifier (110) to compute the super-target. The certificate includes the super-target instead of the targets. Also, a certificate with multiple targets can be signed with a redactable signature by the certification authority (CA 120). When the certificate's owner provides the certificate to a verifier together with a validity proof, the owner redacts the certificate to delete unnecessary targets. A single validity proof (ci(F)) may be provided to certificate owners for a set (F) of the certificates via a multicast transmission if a multicasting group (2010) is formed to correspond to the set. A verifier (110) may decide to cache the validity proof for a set provide the cached proof to other parties. The caching decision is based on the caching priority of the set F. The priority may depend on the number of certificates in the set F, the sum of the remaining validity periods for the certificates in the set, and other factors. In the setup phase, the CA generates validation proof data structures for greater time than the maximum validity period of any certificate. Therefore, new certificates can be added to the existing data structures after the setup phase. A distributed certificate authority includes a CA and a number of Sub-CAs (2610). The Sub-CAs have secret certificate validation data, but different data are provided to different Sub-CAs for each certificate. If a Sub-CA is compromised, the Sub-CA validity proof will be withheld by the CA to alert the verifiers not to use the data from this Sub-CA. Also, the secret data are encrypted when distributed to the Sub-CAs. A decryption key (DK.j.k) for each “partition” of time is distributed to each Sub-CA at or shortly before the start of the partition. A compromised Sub-CA can be reactivated at the end of the partition because the adversary does not get the decryption keys for the future partitions.
    • 42. 发明申请
    • REVOCATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC DIGITAL CERTIFICATES
    • US20090259843A1
    • 2009-10-15
    • US12492908
    • 2009-06-26
    • Craig B. GentryZulfikar Amin RamzanBernhard Bruhn
    • Craig B. GentryZulfikar Amin RamzanBernhard Bruhn
    • H04L9/00
    • H04L9/3265H04L9/3236H04L63/0823H04L2209/38H04L2209/56H04L2209/80
    • Different targets (c0, N1) of a digital certificate are mapped into a “super-target” using methods allowing a certificate validity verifier (110) to compute the super-target. The certificate includes the super-target instead of the targets. Also, a certificate with multiple targets can be signed with a redactable signature by the certification authority (CA 120). When the certificate's owner provides the certificate to a verifier together with a validity proof, the owner redacts the certificate to delete unnecessary targets. A single validity proof (ci(F)) may be provided to certificate owners for a set (F) of the certificates via a multicast transmission if a multicasting group (2010) is formed to correspond to the set. A verifier (110) may decide to cache the validity proof for a set provide the cached proof to other parties. The caching decision is based on the caching priority of the set F. The priority may depend on the number of certificates in the set F, the sum of the remaining validity periods for the certificates in the set, and other factors. In the setup phase, the CA generates validation proof data structures for greater time than the maximum validity period of any certificate. Therefore, new certificates can be added to the existing data structures after the setup phase. A distributed certificate authority includes a CA and a number of Sub-CAs (2610). The Sub-CAs have secret certificate validation data, but different data are provided to different Sub-CAs for each certificate. If a Sub-CA is compromised, the Sub-CA validity proof will be withheld by the CA to alert the verifiers not to use the data from this Sub-CA. Also, the secret data are encrypted when distributed to the Sub-CAs. A decryption key (DK.j.k) for each “partition” of time is distributed to each Sub-CA at or shortly before the start of the partition. A compromised Sub-CA can be reactivated at the end of the partition because the adversary does not get the decryption keys for the future partitions.
    • 46. 发明申请
    • WIRELESS NETWORK HANDOFF KEY
    • 无线网络切换键
    • US20090175454A1
    • 2009-07-09
    • US12402343
    • 2009-03-11
    • Fujio WatanabeCraig B. GentryGang WuToshiro Kawahara
    • Fujio WatanabeCraig B. GentryGang WuToshiro Kawahara
    • H04L9/00
    • H04L9/0836H04L63/0428H04L63/061H04L2209/80H04W12/0013H04W12/04H04W36/0011H04W80/02
    • The present invention provides a method and system for handoff in a wireless communication network. In one embodiment, a common handoff encryption key is generated by an authentication server and transmitted to a first access point and a second access point. The first access point transmits the handoff encryption key to a wireless terminal. The wireless terminal encrypts output data with the handoff encryption key. When the wireless terminal is associated with the second access point, the second access point decrypts data from the wireless terminal with the handoff encryption key. In a second embodiment, a handoff WEP key generation secret parameter is provided to a first and a second access point. Both access points generate a handoff WEP key as a function of the handoff WEP key generation secret parameter and an address of a wireless terminal. The first access point transmits the handoff WEP key to the wireless terminal. The second access point communicates data packets encrypted with the handoff WEP key with the wireless terminal.
    • 本发明提供了一种用于无线通信网络中切换的方法和系统。 在一个实施例中,公共切换加密密钥由认证服务器生成并被发送到第一接入点和第二接入点。 第一接入点将切换加密密钥发送到无线终端。 无线终端用切换加密密钥加密输出数据。 当无线终端与第二接入点相关联时,第二接入点利用切换加密密钥从无线终端解密数据。 在第二实施例中,将切换WEP密钥生成秘密参数提供给第一和第二接入点。 两个接入点根据切换WEP密钥生成秘密参数和无线终端的地址生成切换WEP密钥。 第一接入点将切换WEP密钥发送到无线终端。 第二接入点将与切换WEP密钥一起加密的数据分组与无线终端进行通信。