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    • 91. 发明申请
    • PROTOCOL CONVERSION INVOLVING MULTIPLE VIRTUAL CHANNELS
    • 涉及多个虚拟通道的协议转换
    • US20140304441A1
    • 2014-10-09
    • US13859000
    • 2013-04-09
    • APPLE INC.
    • Deniz BalkanGurjeet S. SaundJoseph P. BrattKevin C. WongManu GulatiRohit K. Gupta
    • G06F13/38
    • G06F13/385
    • Embodiments of a bridge circuit and system are disclosed that may allow converting transactions from one communication protocol to another. The bridge circuit may be coupled to a first bus employing a first communication protocol, and a second bus employing a second communication protocol. The second bus may include a plurality of virtual channels. The bridge circuit may be configured to receive transactions over the first bus, and convert the transactions to the second communication protocol, and to assign the converted transaction to one of the plurality of virtual channels. The bridge circuit may be further configured store the converted transaction. A plurality of limited throughput signals may be generated by the bridge circuit dependent upon a number of available credits for the plurality of virtual channels.
    • 公开了桥接电路和系统的实施例,其可以允许将事务从一个通信协议转换到另一个通信协议。 桥接电路可以耦合到采用第一通信协议的第一总线,以及采用第二通信协议的第二总线。 第二总线可以包括多个虚拟通道。 桥接电路可以被配置为通过第一总线接收事务,并将事务转换为第二通信协议,并将转换的事务分配给多个虚拟通道中的一个。 可以进一步配置桥接电路来存储转换的事务。 取决于多个虚拟信道的可用信用数量,桥电路可以产生多个有限吞吐量信号。
    • 92. 发明授权
    • Security enclave processor for a system on a chip
    • 用于芯片上系统的安全飞地处理器
    • US08832465B2
    • 2014-09-09
    • US13626566
    • 2012-09-25
    • Apple Inc.
    • Manu GulatiMichael J. SmithShu-Yi Yu
    • G06F11/30G06F12/14
    • G06F21/72G06F21/575
    • An SOC implements a security enclave processor (SEP). The SEP may include a processor and one or more security peripherals. The SEP may be isolated from the rest of the SOC (e.g. one or more central processing units (CPUs) in the SOC, or application processors (APs) in the SOC). Access to the SEP may be strictly controlled by hardware. For example, a mechanism in which the CPUs/APs can only access a mailbox location in the SEP is described. The CPU/AP may write a message to the mailbox, which the SEP may read and respond to. The SEP may include one or more of the following in some embodiments: secure key management using wrapping keys, SEP control of boot and/or power management, and separate trust zones in memory.
    • SOC实现安全飞地处理器(SEP)。 SEP可以包括处理器和一个或多个安全外设。 SEP可以与SOC的其余部分隔离(例如SOC中的一个或多个中央处理单元(CPU),或SOC中的应用处理器(AP))。 对SEP的访问可以由硬件严格控制。 例如,描述了CPU / AP仅能访问SEP中的邮箱位置的机制。 CPU / AP可以向邮箱写入消息,SEP可以读取并响应。 在一些实施例中,SEP可以包括以下一个或多个:使用包装密钥的安全密钥管理,引导和/或电源管理的SEP控制以及存储器中的单独的信任区域。